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Re: [Bug-gnuzilla] Browser Fingerprints Solution


From: Loic J. Duros
Subject: Re: [Bug-gnuzilla] Browser Fingerprints Solution
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2014 19:29:01 +0000
User-agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/24.3.50 (gnu/linux)

Yes. I'm aware of their project and their paper on fingerprinting (they
are the ones who started the whole talk on this.)

However gathering the data is only the beginning of it. We need to
figure out what we can fix in the IceCat codebase, what we can easily
have control over, etc, ...

I'm sure there is also other sources of information that can be found
(talks about it were made, ...)

Would you like to step up and start working on this? :)

Loic

Jonas Wielicki <address@hidden> writes:

> On 28.03.2014 19:45, Loic J. Duros wrote:
>> 
>> Also, would anyone on this list research this issue, write back results
>> to the list with a list of elements to work on to reduce fingerprinting, as
>> well as potential implementations for this (Or code submissions?)
>
> I do not know whether you are aware of it, but the EFF has a project
> regarding browser fingerprinting: https://panopticlick.eff.org/
>
> I assume that they have lots of data from that which might be helpful
> identifying fingerprinting pitfalls.
>
> regards,
> Jonas Wielicki
>
>> Just making sure that everyone knows that we need more contributors,
>> always.
>> 
>> Loic
>> 
>> address@hidden (Loic J. Duros) writes:
>> 
>>> Julian <address@hidden> writes:
>>>
>>>> On 03/27/2014 05:52 PM, address@hidden wrote:
>>>>> I am writing to stress out the need of a solution, integrated with 
>>>>> icecat, to use false browser fingerprints and result in opting-out
>>>>> from surveillance.
>>>>
>>>> Nothing wrong with adding anti-fingerprinting to IceCat, but I just
>>>> want to point out that the best way to stop fingerprinting (and
>>>> surveillance in general) is to use the Tor Browser Bundle at its
>>>> default settings. IceCat can never be as good at stopping tracking as
>>>> that, for various reasons.
>>>
>>> Actually, if we are talking about fingerprinting strictly rather than
>>> pure anonimity, I'm not sure how the tor browser fares (I remember the
>>> tor browser draft mentioned fingerprinting at some point.) Anything that
>>> modifies the behavior of your browser has an effect on
>>> fingerprinting. This includes the measures (addons, fixes) taken to
>>> block third-party requests, disable a global js variable, and the like.
>>> The more the browser is out of the ordinary the more unique its
>>> fingerprint. The best way to get a browser to have a more common
>>> fingerprint is to have it masquerade as a common browser, running in a
>>> common operating system, with the expected behavior of a browser, etc,
>>> ...
>>>
>>> Running stuff that will make your browser more private will make your
>>> fingerprint more unique... So it's just a matter of finding the right
>>> balance (you still don't want to leak private data), or finding a way to
>>> mess with the values/mechanisms used for fingerprinting.
>>>
>>> Anyway, this is just my personal opinion which I haven't verified
>>> recently (more like a year and a half ago.)
>>>
>>> --
>>> http://gnuzilla.gnu.org
>> 
>> --
>> http://gnuzilla.gnu.org
>> 
>
>
> --
> http://gnuzilla.gnu.org



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