Re: LYNX-DEV Contents of <TITLE> tag at top of printed page

[David Woolley]

> 
> On Thu, 21 Aug 1997, Kevin Ternes wrote:
> 

> > 
> > The security status of all docs here must be displayed not only on the
> > screen but on each and every printed page.  So all HTML documents here
> > have their status put in the <TITLE> and with Netscape this works out
> > pretty well.  If we are to use Lynx in this environment, it must also

I would class this as another abuse of logical markup to achieve a
particular physical effect.  In a way it is even more extreme than
the normal abuses in that you are really trying to implement a policy
which requires a logical marking.  If it were done in HTML (/SGML)
it should be done with some sort of <CLASSIFICATION> tag, however...

I can't help but feel that someone is trying to get past a contractual
requirement here, rather than doing things really securely.  In my
view, if you are going to security label things, you must security
label everything, unless only the words in the HTML are classified,
e.g. no secret pictures.  The only satisfactory way of doing this is in
the HTTP headers.

Unfortunately, HTTP/HTML was developed in an open environment, so unlike
IP it didn't have security labelling built in (I suspect you aren't
using that in IP!).

Actually PICS (see the www.w3.org site for pointers) does provide
the mechanisms you would need for security labelling, although the
implementation in browsers tends to be to block access, rather than
present a labelled display (it was developed to protect children from
adult sites, but specified in a neutral way to allow any classifcation
scheme).

The one problem with PICS is that, applied strictly, it doesn't admit
that the compound document resulting from the combination of a frameset
and its frames, or the use of inline images, might need a different
classification from the most extreme of its component parts (based on
last looking at PICS at the end of last year).

I'm not aware of any Lynx support for PICS, and it isn't entirely trivial
to implement, although for your purposes, you could further restrict
the allowable formats.  Unfortunately, Lynx is probably the only browser
for which you could implement proper security labelling!  For the others,
you will have to convince them that there is profit in providing it.

(Initially I thought that there may be a case for requesting a security
labelling header in the next version of HTTP, but PICS seems to meet
the requirements, even if it doesn't stress this application to browser
company marketing people.)

Actually, although it doesn't really help with Lynx, I think your best
solution would be to go to PDF, so that a single document is a single
file and includes everthing that must be printed.

Klaus:
> 
> Of course if the "security status" itself is a secret, you shouldn't pass
> it around in an environment variable on an unsecure system...

But then you shouldn't be accessing the document on that system either.

I presume from the description of the problem that the computer and
network must be running "system high", i.e. everyone is cleared to the
highest classification it carries.

On the other hand, titles are usually less classified than the document.
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