bug#65168: Patch "x86/speculation: Add force option to GDS mitigation" has been added to the 5.15-stable tree

[gregkh]

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    x86/speculation: Add force option to GDS mitigation

to the 5.15-stable tree which can be found at:
    
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     x86-speculation-add-force-option-to-gds-mitigation.patch
and it can be found in the queue-5.15 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.


>From cabb00095114a40cc96f3d7766ad1a542f7f8c53 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 18:58:31 +0200
Subject: x86/speculation: Add force option to GDS mitigation

From: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>

commit 553a5c03e90a6087e88f8ff878335ef0621536fb upstream

The Gather Data Sampling (GDS) vulnerability allows malicious software
to infer stale data previously stored in vector registers. This may
include sensitive data such as cryptographic keys. GDS is mitigated in
microcode, and systems with up-to-date microcode are protected by
default. However, any affected system that is running with older
microcode will still be vulnerable to GDS attacks.

Since the gather instructions used by the attacker are part of the
AVX2 and AVX512 extensions, disabling these extensions prevents gather
instructions from being executed, thereby mitigating the system from
GDS. Disabling AVX2 is sufficient, but we don't have the granularity
to do this. The XCR0[2] disables AVX, with no option to just disable
AVX2.

Add a kernel parameter gather_data_sampling=force that will enable the
microcode mitigation if available, otherwise it will disable AVX on
affected systems.

This option will be ignored if cmdline mitigations=off.

This is a *big* hammer.  It is known to break buggy userspace that
uses incomplete, buggy AVX enumeration.  Unfortunately, such userspace
does exist in the wild:

        https://www.mail-archive.com/bug-coreutils@gnu.org/msg33046.html

[ dhansen: add some more ominous warnings about disabling AVX ]

Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst |   18 +++++++++--
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt            |    8 ++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                                 |   20 ++++++++++++-
 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst
@@ -60,14 +60,21 @@ bits:
  ================================   ===   ============================
 
 GDS can also be mitigated on systems that don't have updated microcode by
-disabling AVX. This can be done by setting "clearcpuid=avx" on the kernel
-command-line.
+disabling AVX. This can be done by setting gather_data_sampling="force" or
+"clearcpuid=avx" on the kernel command-line.
+
+If used, these options will disable AVX use by turning on XSAVE YMM support.
+However, the processor will still enumerate AVX support.  Userspace that
+does not follow proper AVX enumeration to check both AVX *and* XSAVE YMM
+support will break.
 
 Mitigation control on the kernel command line
 ---------------------------------------------
 The mitigation can be disabled by setting "gather_data_sampling=off" or
-"mitigations=off" on the kernel command line. Not specifying either will
-default to the mitigation being enabled.
+"mitigations=off" on the kernel command line. Not specifying either will 
default
+to the mitigation being enabled. Specifying "gather_data_sampling=force" will
+use the microcode mitigation when available or disable AVX on affected systems
+where the microcode hasn't been updated to include the mitigation.
 
 GDS System Information
 ------------------------
@@ -83,6 +90,9 @@ The possible values contained in this fi
  Vulnerable                     Processor vulnerable and mitigation disabled.
  Vulnerable: No microcode       Processor vulnerable and microcode is missing
                                 mitigation.
+ Mitigation: AVX disabled,
+ no microcode                   Processor is vulnerable and microcode is 
missing
+                                mitigation. AVX disabled as mitigation.
  Mitigation: Microcode          Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
                                 effect.
  Mitigation: Microcode (locked) Processor is vulnerable and mitigation is in
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1511,7 +1511,13 @@
 
                        This issue is mitigated by default in updated microcode.
                        The mitigation may have a performance impact but can be
-                       disabled.
+                       disabled. On systems without the microcode mitigation
+                       disabling AVX serves as a mitigation.
+
+                       force:  Disable AVX to mitigate systems without
+                               microcode mitigation. No effect if the microcode
+                               mitigation is present. Known to cause crashes in
+                               userspace with buggy AVX enumeration.
 
                        off:    Disable GDS mitigation.
 
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -652,6 +652,7 @@ early_param("l1d_flush", l1d_flush_parse
 enum gds_mitigations {
        GDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
        GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+       GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE,
        GDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
        GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED,
        GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR,
@@ -662,6 +663,7 @@ static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigati
 static const char * const gds_strings[] = {
        [GDS_MITIGATION_OFF]            = "Vulnerable",
        [GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED]   = "Vulnerable: No microcode",
+       [GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE]          = "Mitigation: AVX disabled, no 
microcode",
        [GDS_MITIGATION_FULL]           = "Mitigation: Microcode",
        [GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED]    = "Mitigation: Microcode (locked)",
        [GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR]     = "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor 
status",
@@ -687,6 +689,7 @@ void update_gds_msr(void)
                rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
                mcu_ctrl &= ~GDS_MITG_DIS;
                break;
+       case GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE:
        case GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
        case GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR:
                return;
@@ -721,10 +724,23 @@ static void __init gds_select_mitigation
 
        /* No microcode */
        if (!(x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL)) {
-               gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+               if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE) {
+                       /*
+                        * This only needs to be done on the boot CPU so do it
+                        * here rather than in update_gds_msr()
+                        */
+                       setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AVX);
+                       pr_warn("Microcode update needed! Disabling AVX as 
mitigation.\n");
+               } else {
+                       gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+               }
                goto out;
        }
 
+       /* Microcode has mitigation, use it */
+       if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE)
+               gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+
        rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
        if (mcu_ctrl & GDS_MITG_LOCKED) {
                if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
@@ -755,6 +771,8 @@ static int __init gds_parse_cmdline(char
 
        if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
                gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+       else if (!strcmp(str, "force"))
+               gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE;
 
        return 0;
 }


Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from 
daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com are

queue-5.15/x86-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch
queue-5.15/arm-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch
queue-5.15/x86-speculation-add-kconfig-option-for-gds.patch
queue-5.15/um-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch
queue-5.15/mips-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch
queue-5.15/init-x86-move-mem_encrypt_init-into-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch
queue-5.15/sh-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch
queue-5.15/x86-speculation-add-gather-data-sampling-mitigation.patch
queue-5.15/init-invoke-arch_cpu_finalize_init-earlier.patch
queue-5.15/kvm-add-gds_no-support-to-kvm.patch
queue-5.15/x86-fpu-move-fpu-initialization-into-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch
queue-5.15/x86-speculation-add-force-option-to-gds-mitigation.patch
queue-5.15/init-remove-check_bugs-leftovers.patch
queue-5.15/init-provide-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch
queue-5.15/m68k-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch
queue-5.15/x86-init-initialize-signal-frame-size-late.patch
queue-5.15/sparc-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch
queue-5.15/x86-fpu-mark-init-functions-__init.patch
queue-5.15/ia64-cpu-switch-to-arch_cpu_finalize_init.patch
queue-5.15/x86-fpu-remove-cpuinfo-argument-from-init-functions.patch