ver me, and,
unaccustomed as I was both to this kind of gaiety and to strong drink, I
had surrendered myself without a thought to the mirth that buzzed
contrary' As it was addressed to officers in
all parts of the United Kingdom, the 'general press' was not
confined to London and its neighbourhood, though it was to begin
in the capital
Though returns of the numbers impressed have not been discovered,
we have strong evidence that this 'general press,' notwithstanding
the secrecy with which it had been arranged, was a failure On
the 6th December 1803, just a month after it had been tried, the
Admiralty formulated the following conclusion 'On a consideration
of the expense attending the service of raising men on shore for
His Majesty's Fleet comparatively with the number procured, as
well as from other circumstances, there is reason to believe that
either proper exertions have not been made by some of the officers
employed on that service, or that there have been great abuses
and mismanagement in the expenditure of the public money' This
means that it was now seen that impressment, though of little
use in obtaining men for the navy, was a very costly arrangement
The Lords of the Admiralty accordingly ordered that 'the several
places of rendezvous should be visited and the conduct of the
officers employed in carrying out the above-mentioned service
should be inquired into on the spot' Rear-Admiral Arthur Phillip,
the celebrated first Governor of New South Wales, was ordered
to make the inquiry This was the last duty in which that
distinguished officer was employed, and his having been selected
for it appears to have been unknown to all his biographers
It is not surprising that after this the proceedings of the
press-gang occupy scarcely any space in our naval history Such
references to them as there are will be found in the writings
of the novelist and the dramatist Probably individual cases
of impressment occurred till nearly the end of the Great War;
but they could not have been many Compulsory service most
unnecessarily caused--not much, but still some--unjustifiable
personal hardship It tended to stir up a feeling hostile to
the navy It required to work it machinery costly out of all
proportion to the results obtained Indeed, it failed completely
to effect what had been expected of it In the great days of old
our fleet, after all, was manned, not by impressed men, but by
volunteers It was largely due to that that we became masters
of the sea
VI
PROJECTED INVASIONS OF THE BRITISH ISLES[62]
[Footnote 62 Written in 1900 (_The_Times_)]
The practice to which we have become accustomed of late, of
publishing original documents relating to naval and military
history, has been amply justified by the results These meet
the requirements of two classes of readers The publications
satisfy, or at any rate go far towards satisfying, the wishes
of those who want to be entertained, and also of those whose
higher motive is a desire to discover the truth about notable
historical occurrences Putting the public in possession of the
materials, previously hidden in more or less inaccessible
muniment-rooms and record offices, with which the narratives of
professed historians have been constructed, has had advantages
likely to become more and more apparent as time goes on It acts
as a check upon the imaginative tendencies which even eminent
writers have not always been able, by themselves, to keep under
proper control The certainty, nay the mere probability, that
you will be confronted with the witnesses on whose evidence you
profess to have relied--the 'sources' from which your story is
derived--will suggest the necessity of sobriety of statement and
the advisability of subordinating rhetoric to veracity Had the
contemporary documents been available for an immediate appeal to
them by the reading public, we should long ago have rid ourselves
of some dangerous superstitions We should have abandoned our
belief in the fictions that the Armada of 1588 was defeated by the
weather, and that the great Herbert of Torrington was a lubber,
a traitor, and a coward It is not easy to calculate the benefit
that we should have secured, had the presentation of some important
events in the history of our national defence been as accurate as
it was effective Enormous sums of money have been wasted in trying
to make our defensive arrangements square with a conception of
history based upon misunderstanding or misinterpretation of facts
Pecuniary extravagance is bad enough; but there is a greater evil
still We have been taught to cherish, and we have been reluctant
to abandon, a false standard of defence, though adherence to
such a standard can be shown to have brought the country within
measurable distance of grievous peril Captain Duro, of the Spanish
Navy, in his 'Armada Invencible,' placed within our reach
contemporary evidence from the side of the assailants, thereby
assisting us to form a judgment on a momentous episode in naval
history The evidence was completed; some being adduced from
the other side, by our fellow-countryman Sir J K Laughton, in
his 'Defeat of the Spanish Armada,' published by the Navy Records
Society Others have worked on similar lines; and a healthier view
of our strategic conditions and needs is more widely held than
it was; though it cannot be said to be, even yet, universally
prevalent Superstition, even the grossest, dies hard
Something deeper than mere literary interest, therefore, is to
be attributed to a work which has recently appeared in Paris[63]
To speak strictly, it should be said that only the first volume of
three which will complete it has been published It is, however,
in the nature of a work of the kind that its separate parts should
be virtually independent of each other Consequently the volume
which we now have may be treated properly as a book by itself
When completed the work is to contain all the documents relating
to the French preparations during the period 1793-1805, for taking
the offensive against England (_tous_les_documents_se_rapportant_
_a_la_preparation_
|