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[Auth]Greetings...


From: Mike Warren
Subject: [Auth]Greetings...
Date: 19 Oct 2001 16:04:55 -0600
User-agent: Gnus/5.0807 (Gnus v5.8.7) XEmacs/21.1 (20 Minutes to Nikko)

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I just joined this list and haven't seen any traffic yet, so this is
sort of a test ;)

I am interested in seeing a system like that implemented (and recently
discontinued) by Zero Knolwedge (see http://opensource.zeroknowledge.com for
some code).

Basically, it allowed one to create anonymous identities (they called
these ``Nyms''). These were used with the rest of their system, mostly
for encrypted email. The interesting aspects of their system:

. there was an untraceable way to purchase Nyms via a ``nym-token'' sort
  of digital cash -- one bought some nym tokens with a credit card or
  cash and then later redeemed these tokens for a Nym (or whatever else
  one could buy with the nym-tokens).

. It was not possible to determine who owned which Nym, nor where the
  person using a Nym was on the network. ZK maintained a system of
  servers (freedon.net) to accomplish this. The code for these servers
  is GPL.

I think the ZK system would mesh well with what I understand the goals
of DotGNU (specially the Virtual Identities stuff) to be. On the
free-developers list, I proposed an authentication system modeled
after the ZK freedom network.

For those who haven't read those posts, briefly:

. multiple authorities could issue identity certificates

. each user would typically have lots of different identification
  certificates, each reflecting a different amount of information
  revealed (i.e. one might contain just a name, one might also have an
  address, one might also have a credit card).

. DotGNU-services companies would decide how much they trust each
  certificate-issuing authority.

. DotGNU-service providers would obtain information about users
  through their certificates. A DotGNU provider would never have to
  maintain personal information in a database. (If the service-provider
  needs information about subscribed users [i.e. a login-id], then the
  service provider issues their own certificate to the user with such
  information; then they must only keep a database of valid login-ids).

. certificates would be encrypted.

. users have much choice: they could issue themselves certificates for
  use where providers don't need a trusted provider, or choose to get a
  certificate from a highly-trusted provider. For example, the FSF might
  be a certificate-provider which has some method of showing that users
  are who they say they are (perhaps via a small credit-card
  transaction system like PayPal uses).

This addresses the following goals of DotGNU:

. users' have sole control over how much information they provide

. providers can insist on verified information, if they like. This
  gives service-providers a lot of confidence in their transaction, and
  would allow for, for example, anonymous users paying via credit
  card. How?  A trusted-certificate provider -- after verifying a
  particular user is who they say they are -- could issue a sort of
  digital-cash token which could be redeemed at the
  service-provider. The service-provider never has to know the true
  identity of the user; they just have to be satisfied that the
  certificate-provider has billed the user correctly. This means users
  would only have to trust ONE authority with their credit-card
  information, instead of trusting everyone with whom they do business.

. such a system might quickly gain ground; it has significant
  advantages over Microsoft's system (anonymity, user-confidence,
  multiple identity providers).

. allows a convenient system for authentication within the DotGNU
  user/provider framework (just the sending of a certificate).

Of course, I've left out many details (which I haven't really fleshed
out myself). I'm not a cryptography expert, but what understanding I
have leads me to believe that such a system could be made workable and
secure.

Best of all, there is existing GPL code for at least part of the
system (the anonymizing-network) and numerous white-papers (at ZK)
outlining security concerns and potential and actual workarounds.


Anyway. This turned out a little longer than I expected ;) A little
about me:

I am a 24-year-old recent comp.sci graduate currently working at a
pipeline company doing leak-detection in Calgary, Alberta. I would be
keen to work on a virtual-identities system if it looks like a Good
Thing.

Cheers,

- -- 
address@hidden
<URL:http://www.mike-warren.com>
GPG: 0x579911BD :: 87F2 4D98 BDB0 0E90 EE2A  0CF9 1087 0884 5799 11BD


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