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[Duplicity-talk] strategy for error: sign+encrypt failed: unusable publi


From: edgar . soldin
Subject: [Duplicity-talk] strategy for error: sign+encrypt failed: unusable public key
Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2008 19:57:07 +0200
User-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.1.17) Gecko/20080914 Thunderbird/2.0.0.17 Mnenhy/0.7.5.0

Hello all,

somebody switching from an old to the recent ftplicity version came up with an error similar to this...

gpg: FFFFFFFF: There is no assurance this key belongs to the named user
gpg: [stdin]: sign+encrypt failed: unusable public key
gpg: encrypted with 2048-bit ELG-E key, ID FFFFFFFF, created 2007-12-17
     "duplicity"
gpg: FFFFFFFF: There is no assurance this key belongs to the named user
gpg: [stdin]: sign+encrypt failed: unusable public key

this was because the selected key was not trusted, he didn't know why it suddenly happend, because the former combination of ftplicity 1.1.1/duplicity 0.4.9/gpg-1.4.5-24.4 worked fine.... but still this can happen when installing/switching machines or accounts - so it should be prevented .. especially as the gpg error message only comes up with verbosity 5 or more

... this made me think of ways to prevent this error .. as I didn't find a way to let gpg show the trust state of a key, the only way for now is to test-sign+encrypt something and to check if that throws an error e.g. > echo "$PASS" | gpg --passphrase-fd 0 -e -r FFFFFFFF --batch -o /tmp/mktemp.file test.txt

the other solution I think of is a bit more straight forward ... why not setting gpg --trust-always .. as the user selects a key that he/her obviously wants to use and therefore has to trust I am interested in opinions about this idea .. as there is currently no scenario I can imagine, except of a hacked backup user account (but then everything is lost already, so it doesn't matter), where the --trust-always could be security problematic

on the other hand .. if there is an easy way to doublecheck if a key is trusted ultimately, I still would think about this way, as test encrypting someting does not seem very elegant to me


thanks for your thoughts .. ede


--
Edgar Soldin





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