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Re: [GNUnet-developers] HKDF usage in GNS block encryption
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From: |
Christian Grothoff |
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Subject: |
Re: [GNUnet-developers] HKDF usage in GNS block encryption |
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Date: |
Mon, 16 Sep 2019 20:02:33 +0200 |
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User-agent: |
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.8.0 |
It is not intended, but AFAIK also has no security implications.
Nevertheless, we should probably plan to fix the swap when we next break
compatibility.
On 9/16/19 7:35 PM, Bernd Fix wrote:
> The function "derive_block_aes_key" in "gnsrecord_crypto.c" swaps the
> arguments for "key" and "salt" in the calls of "hkdf" - is that intented?
>
> If so, what is the rationale behind it? It is done correctly in the
> derivation functions for keys, so I wonder... the entropy of the key
> (~255) is much higher than that of the salt (~50 for a 12-letter label).
> Does that have security implications? >Y<
>
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