[GNUnet-SVN] r12801 - libmicrohttpd/src/daemon

[gnunet]

Author: grothoff
Date: 2010-09-01 15:46:40 +0200 (Wed, 01 Sep 2010)
New Revision: 12801

Modified:
   libmicrohttpd/src/daemon/digestauth.c
Log:
formatting, nitpicks

Modified: libmicrohttpd/src/daemon/digestauth.c
===================================================================
--- libmicrohttpd/src/daemon/digestauth.c       2010-09-01 13:43:49 UTC (rev 
12800)
+++ libmicrohttpd/src/daemon/digestauth.c       2010-09-01 13:46:40 UTC (rev 
12801)
@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@
   cvthex(resphash, sizeof (resphash), response);
 }
 
+
 /**
  * Lookup subvalue off of the HTTP Authorization header
  *
@@ -169,33 +170,36 @@
                const char *data,
                const char *key)
 {
-       size_t keylen = strlen(key);
-       const char *ptr = data;
-       char field[size];
-       char fmt[24 + keylen + 1];
-       int items_read;
-
-       ptr += strstr(ptr, key) - ptr;
-
-       if (*(ptr + keylen) != ' ' && *(ptr + keylen) != '=') {
-               ++ptr;
-               ptr += strstr(ptr, key) - ptr;
-       }
-
-       if (!ptr)
-               return 0;
-
-       snprintf(fmt, 24 + keylen + 1,
-                       "%s%%*[ =\"]%%%u[^, \"]", key, (unsigned int) size - 1);
-
-       items_read = sscanf(ptr, fmt, field);
-
-       if (items_read == 1) {
-               strcpy(dest, field);
-               return strlen(dest);
-       }
-
-       return 0;
+  size_t keylen = strlen(key);
+  const char *ptr = data;
+  char field[size];
+  char fmt[24 + keylen + 1];
+  int items_read;
+  
+  ptr += strstr(ptr, key) - ptr;
+  
+  if (*(ptr + keylen) != ' ' && *(ptr + keylen) != '=') 
+    {
+      ++ptr;
+      ptr += strstr(ptr, key) - ptr;
+    }  
+  if (!ptr)
+    return 0;
+  
+  snprintf(fmt, 
+          sizeof (fmt),
+          "%s%%*[ =\"]%%%u[^, \"]",
+          key, 
+          (unsigned int) size - 1);
+  
+  items_read = sscanf(ptr, fmt, field);
+  
+  if (items_read == 1) 
+    {
+      strcpy(dest, field);
+      return strlen(dest);
+    }  
+  return 0;
 }
 
 
@@ -221,11 +225,12 @@
   if (strncmp(header, _BASE, strlen(_BASE)) != 0)
     return NULL;
 
-  len = lookup_sub_value(user, 50, header, "username");
-
+  len = lookup_sub_value(user,
+                        sizeof (user),
+                        header, 
+                        "username");
   if (!len)
-         return NULL;
-
+    return NULL;
   return strdup(user);
 }
 
@@ -301,7 +306,6 @@
   uint32_t nonce_time;
   uint32_t t;
 
-  
   header = MHD_lookup_connection_value(connection,
                                       MHD_HEADER_KIND,
                                       MHD_HTTP_HEADER_AUTHORIZATION);  
@@ -311,73 +315,83 @@
     return MHD_NO;
 
   rnd = connection->daemon->digest_auth_random;
+  
+  len = lookup_sub_value(ret,
+                        sizeof (ret),
+                        header, "username");
+  if ( (!len) ||
+       (strcmp(username, ret) != 0) ) 
+    return MHD_NO;
+  len = lookup_sub_value(ret, 
+                        sizeof (ret),
+                        header, "realm");  
+  if ( (!len) || 
+       (strcmp(realm, ret) != 0) )
+    return MHD_NO;
+  if ( (0 == lookup_sub_value(uri,
+                             sizeof (uri),
+                             header, "uri")) ||
+       (0 == (len = lookup_sub_value(nonce, 
+                                    sizeof (nonce),
+                                    header, "nonce"))) )
+    return MHD_NO;
+  
+  /* 8 = 4 hexadecimal numbers for the timestamp */  
+  nonce_time = strtoul(nonce + len - 8, 0, 16);  
+  t = (uint32_t) time(NULL);    
+  /*
+   * First level vetting for the nonce validity
+   * if the timestamp attached to the nonce
+   * exceeds `nonce_timeout' then the nonce is
+   * invalid.
+   */
+  if (t > nonce_time + nonce_timeout) 
+    return MHD_INVALID_NONCE;    
+  calculate_nonce (nonce_time,
+                  connection->method,
+                  rnd,
+                  uri,
+                  realm,
+                  noncehashexp);
+  /*
+   * Second level vetting for the nonce validity
+   * if the timestamp attached to the nonce is valid
+   * and possibility fabricated (in case of an attack)
+   * the attacker must also know the password to be
+   * able to generate a "sane" nonce, which if he does
+   * not, the nonce fabrication process going to be
+   * very hard to achieve.
+   */
+  
+  if (0 != strcmp(nonce, noncehashexp))
+    return MHD_INVALID_NONCE;
+  if ( (0 == lookup_sub_value(cnonce,
+                             sizeof (cnonce), 
+                             header, "cnonce")) ||
+       /*       (0 == lookup_sub_value(qop, sizeof (qop), header, "qop")) || 
// Uncomment when supporting "auth-int" */
+       (0 == lookup_sub_value(nc, sizeof (nc), header, "nc"))  ||
+       (0 == lookup_sub_value(response, sizeof (response), header, 
"response")) )
+    return MHD_NO;
 
-       len = lookup_sub_value(ret, 60, header, "username");
-    if ( (!len) ||
-        (strcmp(username, ret) != 0) ) 
-      return MHD_NO;
-    len = lookup_sub_value(ret, 60, header, "realm");  
-    if ( (!len) || 
-        (strcmp(realm, ret) != 0) )
-      return MHD_NO;
-    if ( (0 == lookup_sub_value(uri, 100, header, "uri")) ||
-        (0 == (len = lookup_sub_value(nonce, 50, header, "nonce"))) )
-      return MHD_NO;
+  digest_calc_ha1("md5",
+                 username,
+                 realm,
+                 password,
+                 nonce,
+                 cnonce,
+                 ha1);
+  digest_calc_response(ha1,
+                      nonce,
+                      nc,
+                      cnonce,
+                      qop,
+                      connection->method,
+                      uri,
+                      hentity,
+                      respexp);  
   
-    /* 8 = 4 hexadecimal numbers for the timestamp */  
-    nonce_time = strtoul(nonce + len - 8, 0, 16);  
-    t = (uint32_t) time(NULL);    
-    /*
-     * First level vetting for the nonce validity
-     * if the timestamp attached to the nonce
-     * exceeds `nonce_timeout' then the nonce is
-     * invalid.
-     */
-    if (t > nonce_time + nonce_timeout) 
-      return MHD_INVALID_NONCE;    
-    calculate_nonce (nonce_time,
-                    connection->method,
-                    rnd,
-                    uri,
-                    realm,
-                    noncehashexp);
-    /*
-     * Second level vetting for the nonce validity
-     * if the timestamp attached to the nonce is valid
-     * and possibility fabricated (in case of an attack)
-     * the attacker must also know the password to be
-     * able to generate a "sane" nonce, which if he does
-     * not, the nonce fabrication process going to be
-     * very hard to achieve.
-     */
-    
-    if (0 != strcmp(nonce, noncehashexp))
-      return MHD_INVALID_NONCE;
-    if ( (0 == lookup_sub_value(cnonce, 50, header, "cnonce")) ||
-/*      (0 == lookup_sub_value(qop, 15, header, "qop")) || // Uncomment when 
supporting "auth-int" */
-        (0 == lookup_sub_value(nc, 10, header, "nc"))  ||
-        (0 == lookup_sub_value(response, 35, header, "response")) )
-      return MHD_NO;
-
-       digest_calc_ha1("md5",
-                   username,
-                   realm,
-                   password,
-                   nonce,
-                   cnonce,
-                   ha1);
-    digest_calc_response(ha1,
-                               nonce,
-                               nc,
-                               cnonce,
-                               qop,
-                               connection->method,
-                               uri,
-                               hentity,
-                               respexp);  
-
-       auth = strcmp(response, respexp) == 0 ? MHD_YES : MHD_NO;
-
+  auth = strcmp(response, respexp) == 0 ? MHD_YES : MHD_NO;
+  
   return auth;
 }