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[GNUnet-SVN] [taler-marketing] branch master updated: rand is always low


From: gnunet
Subject: [GNUnet-SVN] [taler-marketing] branch master updated: rand is always lower case
Date: Sun, 26 May 2019 11:34:47 +0200

This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script.

dold pushed a commit to branch master
in repository marketing.

The following commit(s) were added to refs/heads/master by this push:
     new 7d88d81  rand is always lower case
7d88d81 is described below

commit 7d88d81e18f3f12e5b4e96e3ffd93607eeb59d61
Author: Florian Dold <address@hidden>
AuthorDate: Sun May 26 11:34:38 2019 +0200

    rand is always lower case
---
 sa/sa.tex | 20 ++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/sa/sa.tex b/sa/sa.tex
index 2464be8..bd38b41 100644
--- a/sa/sa.tex
+++ b/sa/sa.tex
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ solutions lacked.
 In summary, the overall system roughly operates as follows: The Taler wallet 
is filled via
 wire-transfer to the Taler exchange's escrow account, where the subject
 identifies the Taler wallet eligible to withdraw the CBDC.  Regulators can
-limit the amount an entity is entitled to exchange from Rand into CBDC, like
+limit the amount an entity is entitled to exchange from rand into CBDC, like
 ATM withdrawal limits.  When withdrawing electronic coins, they are blindly 
signed by the
 Taler exchange and stored in the consumer's wallet, which is value-based.  The
 consumer can then spend its coins at merchants using cryptographic signatures
@@ -159,8 +159,8 @@ forth in the SARB tender in Section~3.
   electronic money issuer is allowed to issue coins of a particular
   denomination.  Usually the auditor would be tied to the
   regulation of the respective central bank.  Thus, if SARB
-  only qualifies itself to issue CBDC for Rand, then only SARB
-  can issue Taler CBDC for Rand.
+  only qualifies itself to issue CBDC for rand, then only SARB
+  can issue Taler CBDC for rand.
 \item
 {\bf A possible alternative scenario is for the SARB to back the CBDC and to 
set
 regulatory standards and interoperability requirements, but with commercial 
banks
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ acting as issuing authorities under the regulatory 
oversight of the SARB.}
   banks moving existing funds into an escrow account when creating electronic
   coins.  Thus, the introduction of Taler does not impact monetary policy,
   except that it might be easier for foreigners to obtain and hold electronic
-  coins (compared to obtaining cash or Rand-denominated bank accounts).
+  coins (compared to obtaining cash or rand-denominated bank accounts).
 \item
 {\bf It must be possible to issue and distribute CBDC to commercial banks 
only, or to
 commercial banks as well as licensed service providers. Such licensed service
@@ -265,16 +265,16 @@ store of value and a tokenised store of value. CBDC is 
expected to be interest-f
 or attract zero interest. This must, however, be a variable attribute to cater 
for different
 policy positions in future.}
   Taler could theoretically support interest on CBDC by varying the exchange
-  rate between CBDC and Rand.  Taler can also theoretically support {\em 
negative}
+  rate between CBDC and rand.  Taler can also theoretically support {\em 
negative}
   interest on coins held long-term in wallets.  However, these are optional
   features and in general we fully agree that the most usable and practical 
design
-  is to fix the exchange rate between CBDC and Rand and to not impose 
significant
+  is to fix the exchange rate between CBDC and rand and to not impose 
significant
   fees on holding coins.
 
 \subsection{Branding}
 \item
   {\bf CBDC must be branded and its ownership by the SARB as issuer must be 
evident.}
-  Given that the CBDC is denominated in Rand, this should be trivial.
+  Given that the CBDC is denominated in rand, this should be trivial.
   We can also create SARB-branded software if desired.
 \item
 {\bf CBDC must be unique in its design and its SARB ownership must be clear and
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ policy positions in future.}
   a safe store of value, and as secure means to transfer value during 
transacting.}
   The SARB would primarily hold the escrow account (or liability).  It could 
also either
   (1) run the operations of the exchange and guarantee the exchange of CBDC
-  in Rand directly, or (2) else audit privately operated exchanges
+  in rand directly, or (2) else audit privately operated exchanges
   similar to its regulatory oversight of conventional banks and payment 
processors.
   This should assure the public about the safety of the CBDC.
   We are not familiar with legal tender regulation in SA to determine what 
else would
@@ -688,7 +688,7 @@ from their traditional bank accounts, or they could be 
provided
 CBDC directly (for example via social security) if they lack
 a bank account.  Electronic coins are blindly signed
 by the issuing exchange, which is obliged to exchange CBDC
-back into Rand when they are deposited by merchants.  An auditor
+back into rand when they are deposited by merchants.  An auditor
 supervises the operation of the exchange, unless the exchange
 is fully operated within SARB's trusted infrastructure. In this
 case, SARB may still want to run the auditing logic to provide
@@ -783,7 +783,7 @@ available on all relevant platforms.  However, consumer 
systems are
 much less diverse and hence this effort is significantly smaller.
 
 Deploying Taler at scale should have no major impact on monetary
-policy because the issued CBDC would be 1:1 backed by Rand
+policy because the issued CBDC would be 1:1 backed by rand
 in the escrow account at the SARB.  However, if there is a
 significant shift from the use of credit-cards to CBDC, there might
 be a reduction in M2 from fractional reserve banking as CBDC is

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