[taler-anastasis] branch master updated: fix sections

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dennis-neufeld pushed a commit to branch master
in repository anastasis.

The following commit(s) were added to refs/heads/master by this push:
     new 24dc700  fix sections
24dc700 is described below

commit 24dc70008442d5b57ed22c50308e431a813070a8
Author: Dennis Neufeld <dennis.neufeld@students.bfh.ch>
AuthorDate: Sat Jun 6 17:49:35 2020 +0000

    fix sections
---
 doc/thesis/introduction.tex | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/doc/thesis/introduction.tex b/doc/thesis/introduction.tex
index 9a81c1e..071efbd 100644
--- a/doc/thesis/introduction.tex
+++ b/doc/thesis/introduction.tex
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ For Anastasis we have following design principles, in order 
of importance:
 \end{enumerate}
 
 \subsection{Approaches}
-\subsubsection{Secret sharing and recovery}
+\subsubsection*{Secret sharing and recovery}
 Our approach to solve the problem of key management is to let the user split 
their secret across multiple escrow providers (see figure 
\ref{fig:system_arch2}). To restore the secret again, the user has to follow 
standard authentication procedures. After successful authentication the user 
gets the secret shares to reassemble the secret.
 \begin{figure}[H]
 \centering
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Our approach to solve the problem of key management is to let 
the user split the
 \label{fig:system_arch2}
 \end{figure}
 
-\subsubsection{Derive user identifier}
+\subsubsection*{Derive user identifier}
 Every person has some hard to guess, semi-private and unforgettably inherent 
attributes such as name and passport number, social security number or AHV 
number (in Switzerland). We use those attributes to derive an user identifier 
from (see figure \ref{fig:user_id}).
 \begin{figure}[H]
 \centering
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ There are several applications which are in need of a key 
escrow system like Ana
 
 \subsubsection{Encrypted email communication}
 \subsubsection*{PGP}
-For email encryption using Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)~\cite{garfinkel1995} you 
need a private key which is stored to the device running PGP. Losing the PGP 
private key means following: All received emails which are encrypted with a key 
derived from the private key are unreadable and you need to build your trust 
network again. Because emails could contain high sensitive information, it is 
necessary to be able to store the PGP private key securely.\\
+For email encryption using Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)~\cite{garfinkel1995} you 
need a private key which is stored to the device running PGP. Losing the PGP 
private key means following: All received emails which are encrypted with a key 
derived from the private key are unreadable and you need to build your trust 
network again. Because emails could contain high sensitive information, it is 
necessary to be able to store the PGP private key securely.
 
 \subsubsection*{p\equiv p}
 Pretty Easy privacy (short p\equiv p) is "a cyber security solution which 
protects the confidentiality and reliability of communications for citizens, 
for public offices and for enterprises"~\cite{pepdoc}. It secures communication 
via email by providing an end-to-end cryptography. For this the software uses a 
private key. The impact of losing the private key is similar to those of PGP.\\

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