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[taler-anastasis] branch master updated: user identifier == kdf id


From: gnunet
Subject: [taler-anastasis] branch master updated: user identifier == kdf id
Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2020 12:15:45 +0200

This is an automated email from the git hooks/post-receive script.

grothoff pushed a commit to branch master
in repository anastasis.

The following commit(s) were added to refs/heads/master by this push:
     new b5a0931  user identifier == kdf id
b5a0931 is described below

commit b5a0931f839f562b2478980e686853fe66ff75ff
Author: Christian Grothoff <christian@grothoff.org>
AuthorDate: Thu Jun 11 12:15:43 2020 +0200

    user identifier == kdf id
---
 doc/thesis/design.tex | 14 +++++++-------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/doc/thesis/design.tex b/doc/thesis/design.tex
index 8b48f6f..e548c14 100644
--- a/doc/thesis/design.tex
+++ b/doc/thesis/design.tex
@@ -100,13 +100,13 @@ page~\pageref{fig:truth_keys} are explained:
 \subsection{Adversary model}
 
 The adversary model of Anastasis has two types of adversaries: {\em
-  weak adversaries} which do not know the user’s identifier, and {\em
-  strong adversaries} which somehow do know a user’s
-identifier. Against weak adversaries, the system guarantees full
-confidentiality, except for a provider-specific public account key
-which links requests from the same user, and the data necessary for
-authentication. The latter is only disclosed to the providers when the
-user requests key recovery. Weak adversaries cannot break
+  weak adversaries} which do not know the user’s identifier (the {\em
+  kdf id}), and {\em strong adversaries} which somehow do know a
+user’s identifier. Against weak adversaries, the system guarantees
+full confidentiality, except for a provider-specific public account
+key which links requests from the same user, and the data necessary
+for authentication. The latter is only disclosed to the providers when
+the user requests key recovery. Weak adversaries cannot break
 confidentiality even if all escrow providers are part of a conspiracy
 of weak adversaries.  For strong adversaries, breaking confidentiality
 of the core secret still requires that a sufficient subset of the

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