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Re: SHA-1 MBR
From: |
phcoder |
Subject: |
Re: SHA-1 MBR |
Date: |
Sat, 21 Feb 2009 00:41:45 +0100 |
User-agent: |
Thunderbird 2.0.0.19 (X11/20090105) |
Hello
Jan Alsenz wrote:
Hi!
Wow, cool work!
Thanks
It's not complete SHA-1, but the rest should be just a constant offset.
I already said how it differs from standard one. If you feed padded
byteswapped data to it and then byteswap the rsult back you obtain
exactly normal SHA-1. But as I said if size is fixed it's compeletely
equivalent in security to normal SHA-1 (you can easily prove formally
that any successful attack on one variant immediately results in
successful attack on another variant)
But I'm still not sure, what you are trying to do here, is the MBR your root of
trust?
I'm trying to achieve universal verification scheme which is able to do
what is needed to support tpm ("prolonging chain of trust" in tpm
unstandard parlance) without using tpm itself. Such scheme can in future
be useful in other applications as well.
> If not, who checks the MBR?
This can't be done by grub because it happens before any part of grub is
loaded. to verify grub you need to rely on vendor/platform-specific
mechanisms.
I personally find "tpm without tpm" more attractive because it can be
easily reused on another platform or any alternative to tpm (perhaps
anybody here or coreboot folks will come up with something).
Additionally it workarounds many bios and tpm bugs.
I will continue working on sha-1 boot. My goal is to load core.img
checked. After that point there is much more space and any signature
based solution can be used.
Greets,
Jan
Regards
Vladimir 'phcoder' Serbinenko