Re: A _good_ and valid use for TPM

[Alex Besogonov]

Robert Millan wrote:
> > Making sure, that noone can override it, can be awfully difficult, especially
> > under a physical attacker. A hardware that is at least a bit designed to
> > withstand such an attack can help a lot.
> I'm not sure why is physical security so awfully difficult for you (can't you
> use locks, tamper-proof seals, cameras and alarms?), but most people who're in
> the bussiness of protecting physical goods manage to sort it out.
My devices will be installed at clients' locations. It's impossible to 
guarantee that all devices will be physically secure.

If you live in the USA then one day such device might contain your 
private data. Would you like it to be stolen?

I'm trying to design them so that data can't be stolen easily. Even by 
me, if someday I become insane because of flame-wars in mailing lists.

> In any case, if your attacker is that much determined to archieve their goal,
> reverse engineering a small chip isn't going to stop them.
Reverse engineering the TPM chip is very costly. And I'm not going to 
try to protect data from NSA or CIA or another three-letter agency.

--
With respect,
            Alex Besogonov (address@hidden)