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Re: [PATCH 07/10] tpm2_key_protector: Support NV index handles
From: |
Gary Lin |
Subject: |
Re: [PATCH 07/10] tpm2_key_protector: Support NV index handles |
Date: |
Fri, 3 Jan 2025 15:53:15 +0800 |
On Thu, Jan 02, 2025 at 02:54:51PM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
>
>
> On 12/19/24 3:12 AM, Gary Lin wrote:
> > Previously, NV index mode only supported persistent handles which are
> > only for the TPM objects. Without introducing new parameters, it is
>
> for TPM objects.
>
Will fix it in v2.
> > difficult to support authorized policy.
>
> I am not sure how this sentence relates to the patch. Remove it?
>
Okay. My original intension is to express the limitation of persistent
handles, but it seems not necessary anyway.
> >
> > On the other hand, the "NV index" handle allows the user-defined data,
> > so it can be an alternative to the key file and support TPM 2.0 Key> File
> format immediately.
> >
> > The following tpm2-tools commands stores the given key file, sealed.tpm,
>
> /stores/store
>
> > in either TPM 2.0 Key File format or the raw format into the NV index
> > handle, 0x1000000.
>
> remove ','
>
Will fix them in v2.
> >
> > # tpm2_nvdefine -C o \
> > -a "ownerread|policywrite|ownerwrite" \
> > -s $(stat -c %s sealed.tpm) \
> > 0x1000000
> > # tpm2_nvwrite -C o -i sealed.tpm 0x1000000
> >
> > To unseal the key in GRUB, add the 'tpm2_key_protector_init' command to
> > grub.cfg:
> >
> > tpm2_key_protector_init --mode=nv --nvindex=0x1000000
>
> This works for as long as NO password in the owner hierarchy is set.
>
The password of owner hierarchy is already addressed in grub.texi, so I
assume that there is no password for the owner hierarchy.
> > cryptomount -u <UUID> --protector tpm2
> >
> > To remove the NV index handle:
> >
> > # tpm2_nvundefine -C o 0x1000000
> > > Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
> > ---
> > .../commands/tpm2_key_protector/module.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++---
> > 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/grub-core/commands/tpm2_key_protector/module.c
> > b/grub-core/commands/tpm2_key_protector/module.c
> > index e58da6f7a..1b3b89df8 100644
> > --- a/grub-core/commands/tpm2_key_protector/module.c
> > +++ b/grub-core/commands/tpm2_key_protector/module.c
> > @@ -1133,10 +1133,9 @@ tpm2_protector_srk_recover (const
> > tpm2_protector_context_t *ctx,
> > }
> > static grub_err_t
> > -tpm2_protector_nv_recover (const tpm2_protector_context_t *ctx,
> > - grub_uint8_t **key, grub_size_t *key_size)
> > +tpm2_protector_unseal_persistent (const tpm2_protector_context_t *ctx,
> > TPM_HANDLE_t sealed_handle,
> > + grub_uint8_t **key, grub_size_t *key_size)
> > {
> > - TPM_HANDLE_t sealed_handle = ctx->nv;
> > tpm2key_policy_t policy_seq = NULL;
> > bool dump_pcr = false;
> > grub_err_t err;
> > @@ -1163,6 +1162,51 @@ tpm2_protector_nv_recover (const
> > tpm2_protector_context_t *ctx,
> > return err;
> > }
> > +static grub_err_t
> > +tpm2_protector_unseal_nvindex (const tpm2_protector_context_t *ctx,
> > TPM_HANDLE_t nvindex,
> > + grub_uint8_t **key, grub_size_t *key_size)
> > +{
> > + TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND_t authCmd = {0};
> > + TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC_t nv_public;
> > + TPM2B_NAME_t nv_name;
> > + grub_uint16_t data_size;
> > + TPM2B_MAX_NV_BUFFER_t data;
> > + TPM_RC_t rc;
> > +
> > + /* Get the data size in the NV index handle */
> > + rc = grub_tpm2_nv_readpublic (nvindex, NULL, &nv_public, &nv_name);
> > + if (rc != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
> > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "failed to retrieve info
> > from 0x%x (TPM2_NV_ReadPublic: 0x%x)", nvindex, rc);
> > +
> > + data_size = nv_public.nvPublic.dataSize;
> > + if (data_size > TPM_MAX_NV_BUFFER_SIZE)
> > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "insufficient data buffer");
> > +
> > + /* Read the data from the NV index handle */
> > + authCmd.sessionHandle = TPM_RS_PW;
> > + rc = grub_tpm2_nv_read (TPM_RH_OWNER, nvindex, &authCmd, data_size, 0,
> > &data);
> > + if (rc != TPM_RC_SUCCESS)
> > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "failed to read data from
> > 0x%x (TPM2_NV_Read: 0x%x)", nvindex, rc);
> > +
> > + return tpm2_protector_unseal_buffer (ctx, data.buffer, data_size, key,
> > key_size);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static grub_err_t
> > +tpm2_protector_nv_recover (const tpm2_protector_context_t *ctx,
> > + grub_uint8_t **key, grub_size_t *key_size)
> > +{
> > + grub_err_t err;
> > +
> > + if (TPM_HT_IS_PERSISTENT (ctx->nv) == true)
>
> you could omit '== true' here as well and in all other cases, unless this is
> mandatory in GRUB
>
I'll keep it since '== true' is requested in the previous review.
> > + err = tpm2_protector_unseal_persistent (ctx, ctx->nv, key, key_size);
> > + else if (TPM_HT_IS_NVINDEX (ctx->nv) == true)
> > + err = tpm2_protector_unseal_nvindex (ctx, ctx->nv, key, key_size);
> > + else
> > + err = GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
> > +
> > + return err;
> > +}
> > +
> > static grub_err_t
> > tpm2_protector_recover (const tpm2_protector_context_t *ctx,
> > grub_uint8_t **key, grub_size_t *key_size)
> > @@ -1207,22 +1251,23 @@ tpm2_protector_check_args (tpm2_protector_context_t
> > *ctx)
> > return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("in SRK mode, please
> > specify a key file with only --tpm2key/-T or --keyfile/-k"));
> > if (ctx->mode == TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_SRK && ctx->nv != 0)
> > - return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("in SRK mode, an NV Index
> > cannot be specified"));
> > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("in SRK mode, a NV Index
> > cannot be specified"));
>
> 'an' was correct because it's spoken like 'envy', so starts with a vowel
>
Ah, thanks.
> > /* Checks for NV mode */
> > if (ctx->mode == TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_NV && ctx->nv == 0)
> > - return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("in NV Index mode, an NV
> > Index must be specified: --nvindex or -n"));
> > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("in NV Index mode, a NV
> > Index must be specified: --nvindex or -n"));
>
> same
>
> > if (ctx->mode == TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_NV &&
> > (ctx->tpm2key != NULL || ctx->keyfile != NULL))
> > return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("in NV Index mode, a
> > keyfile cannot be specified"));
>
> a key file cannot be specified when using NV Index mode
>
> > > - if (ctx->mode == TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_NV && ctx->srk != 0)
> > - return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("in NV Index mode, an SRK
> > cannot be specified"));
> > + if (ctx->mode == TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_NV && TPM_HT_IS_PERSISTENT
> > (ctx->nv) == true &&
> > + (ctx->srk != 0 || ctx->srk_type.type != TPM_ALG_ERROR))
> > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("in NV Index mode with a
> > persistent handle, a SRK cannot be specified"));
>
> an SRK cannot be specified when using NV Index mode with a persistent handle
>
>
> > if (ctx->mode == TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_NV &&
> > - ctx->srk_type.type != TPM_ALG_ERROR)
> > - return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("in NV Index mode, an
> > asymmetric key type cannot be specified"));
> > + (TPM_HT_IS_PERSISTENT (ctx->nv) == false && TPM_HT_IS_NVINDEX
> > (ctx->nv) == false))
> > + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("in NV Index mode, a NV
> > index must be a persistent or NV index handle"));
>
> an NV index must be either a persistent handle or an NV index handle when
> using NV index mode
>
Will fix the sentances above in v2.
> > /* Defaults assignment */
> > if (ctx->bank == TPM_ALG_ERROR)
> > @@ -1234,8 +1279,13 @@ tpm2_protector_check_args (tpm2_protector_context_t
> > *ctx)
> > ctx->pcr_count = 1;
> > }
> > - if (ctx->mode == TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_SRK &&
> > - ctx->srk_type.type == TPM_ALG_ERROR)
> > + /*
> > + * Set ECC_NIS_P256 as the default SRK when using SRK mode or NV mode
> > with
>
> ECC_NIST_P256
>
Oops, thanks for spotting the typo.
> > + * a NV index handle
>
> an NV index handle
>
Will fix it in v2.
Gary Lin
> > + */
> > + if (ctx->srk_type.type == TPM_ALG_ERROR &&
> > + (ctx->mode == TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_SRK ||
> > + (ctx->mode == TPM2_PROTECTOR_MODE_NV && TPM_HT_IS_NVINDEX (ctx->nv)
> > == true)))
> > {
> > ctx->srk_type.type = TPM_ALG_ECC;
> > ctx->srk_type.detail.ecc_curve = TPM_ECC_NIST_P256;
>