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draft-zhu-spnego-2478bis-01.txt
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2004/11/22 21:29:43 1.1
NETWORK WORKING GROUP L. Zhu
Internet-Draft P. Leach
Obsoletes: 2478 (if approved) K. Jaganathan
Expires: May 22, 2005 Microsoft Corporation
S. Harman
MIT
W. Ingersoll
Sun Microsystems
November 21, 2004
The Simple and Protected GSS-API Negotiation Mechanism
draft-zhu-spnego-2478bis-01
Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions
of section 3 of RFC 3667. By submitting this Internet-Draft, each
author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of
which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of
which he or she become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with
RFC 3668.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as
Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on May 22, 2005.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).
Abstract
This document specifies a negotiation mechanism for the Generic
Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) which is
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described in RFC 2743.
GSS-API peers can use this negotiation mechanism to choose from a
common set of security mechanisms.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Negotiation Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1 Negotiation Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2 Negotiation Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Token Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1 Mechanism Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2 Negotiation Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2.1 negTokenInit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2.2 negTokenResp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Processing of mechListMIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A. GSS-API Negotiation Support API . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
A.1 GSS_Set_neg_mechs call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
A.2 GSS_Get_neg_mechs call . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
B. Changes since RFC2478 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 22
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1. Introduction
The GSS-API [RFC2743] provides a generic interface which can be
layered atop different security mechanisms such that if communicating
peers acquire GSS-API credentials for the same security mechanism,
then a security context may be established between them (subject to
policy). However, GSS-API doesn't prescribe the method by which
GSS-API peers can establish whether they have a common security
mechanism.
The Simple and Protected GSS-API Negotiation (SPNEGO) mechanism
defined here is a pseudo security mechanism, represented by the
Object Identifier iso.org.dod.internet.security.mechanism.snego
(1.3.6.1.5.5.2), which enables GSS-API peers to determine in-band
whether their credentials share common GSS-API security mechanism(s),
and if so, to invoke normal security context establishment for a
selected common security mechanism. This is most useful for
applications that are based on GSS-API implementations and multiple
mechanisms are shared between the peers.
The SPNEGO mechanism negotiation is based on the following
negotiation model: the initiator proposes a list of security
mechanism(s), in its preference order (favorite choice first), the
acceptor (also known as the target) either accepts the initiator's
preferred security mechanism (the first in the list), or chooses one
that is available from the offered list, or rejects the proposed
value(s). The target then informs the initiator of its choice.
Once a common security mechanism is chosen, it MAY also negotiate
mechanism-specific options during its context establishment, but that
will be inside the mechanism tokens and invisible to this protocol.
If per-message integrity services are available on the established
mechanism security context, the peers can then exchange MIC tokens to
ensure that the mechanism list was not tampered with. This MIC token
exchange is OPTIONAL if no interference could have material impact on
the negotiation, i.e., when the selected mechanism is the first
choice for both peers.
In order to avoid an extra round trip, the first security token of
the preferred mechanism SHOULD be embedded in the initial negotiation
message (as defined in Section 4.2). This mechanism token is
referred to as the optimistic token in this document. If the
selected mechanism matches the initiator's preferred mechanism, no
additional round trips need to be incurred by using this protocol.
In addition, by using the optimistic token, the initiator can recover
from a non-fatal error in producing the first token before a
mechanism can be selected. Implementations, however, MAY omit the
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optimistic token, to avoid the cost of generating it in cases where
the initiator's preferred mechanism is not selected by the acceptor.
SPNEGO uses the concepts developed in the GSS-API specification
[RFC2743]. The negotiation data is encapsulated in context-level
tokens. Therefore, callers of the GSS-API do not need to be aware of
the existence of the negotiation tokens but only of the new
pseudo-security mechanism. A failure in the negotiation phase causes
a major status code to be returned: GSS_S_BAD_MECH.
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2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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3. Negotiation Protocol
When the established mechanism context provides for integrity
protection, the mechanism negotiation can be protected. When
acquiring negotiated security mechanism tokens, per-message integrity
services are always requested by the SPNEGO mechanism.
When the established mechanism context supports per-message integrity
services, SPNEGO guarantees that the selected mechanism is mutually
preferred.
This section describes the negotiation process of this protocol.
3.1 Negotiation Description
The first negotiation token sent by the initiator contains an ordered
list of mechanisms (in preference order, favorite choice first), and
optionally the initial security token for the preferred mechanism of
the initiator (i.e., the first in the list). The list of security
mechanisms available for negotiation is based on the credentials
being used.
The target then processes the token from the initiator. This will
result in one of four possible states (as defined in Section 4.2.2):
accept_completed, accept_incomplete, reject, or request_mic. A
reject state will terminate the negotiation; an accept_completed
state indicates that not only was the initiator-selected mechanism
acceptable to the target, but that the initial token was sufficient
to complete the authentication; an accept_incomplete state indicates
that further message exchange is needed but the MIC token exchange as
described in Section 5 is OPITONAL; a request_mic state (this state
can only be present in the first reply message from the target)
indicates the MIC token exchange is REQUIRED if per-message integrity
services are available.
Unless the preference order is specified by the application (see
Appendix A), the policy by which the target chooses a mechanism is an
implementation-specific local matter. In the absence of application
specified preference order or other policy, the target SHALL choose
the first mechanism in the initiator proposed list for which it has
valid credentials.
In case of a successful negotiation, the security mechanism in the
first reply message represents the value suitable for the target, and
picked up from the list offered by the initiator. A context level
token for a reject state is OPTIONAL.
Once a mechanism has been selected, the tokens specific to the
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selected mechanism are carried within the negotiation tokens.
Lastly, MIC tokens MAY be exchanged to ensure the authenticity of the
mechanism list as seen by the target.
To avoid conflicts with the use of MIC tokens by SPNEGO,
partially-established contexts are not used for per-message calls:
the prot_ready_state [RFC2743] will be false even if the underlying
mechanism would return true natively.
3.2 Negotiation Procedure
The basic form of the procedure assumes that per-message integrity
services are available on the established mechanism context, and it
is summarized as follows:
(a) The GSS-API initiator invokes GSS_Init_sec_context() as normal,
but requests (either explicitly, with the negotiation mechanism,
or through accepting a default, when the default is this
negotiation mechanism) that SPNEGO is used.
(b) The initiator GSS-API implementation emits a negotiation token
containing a list of supported security mechanisms (possible just
one mechanism) for the credentials used for this context
establishment, and optionally an initial security token for the
first mechanism from that list.
(c) The GSS-API initiator application sends the token to the target
application. The GSS-API target application deposits the token
through invoking GSS_Accept_sec_context(). The acceptor will do
one of the following:
(I) No proposed mechanism is acceptable, the negotiation SHALL be
terminated. GSS_Accept_sec_context indicates GSS_S_BAD_MECH.
The acceptor MAY output a negotiation token containing a reject
state.
(II) If either the initiator's preferred mechanism is not accepted
by the target, or this mechanism is accepted but it is not the
most preferred mechanism available for the acceptor (see
Section 3.1 and Section 5), GSS_Accept_sec_context() indicates
GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED. The acceptor MUST output a negotiation
token containing a request_mic state.
(III) Otherwise, GSS_Accept_sec_conext() indicates GSS_S_COMPLETE
or GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED, depending on if at least one
additional negotiation token from the initiator is needed to
establish this context. The acceptor outputs a negotiation
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token containing an accept_complete or accept_incomplete state,
respectively.
If the initiator's preferred mechanism is accepted, and an
optimistic mechanism token was included, this mechanism token MUST
be deposited to the selected mechanism through invoking
GSS_Accept_sec_context() and if a response mechanism token is
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