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49/66: programming-2022: Fix typos.


From: Ludovic Courtès
Subject: 49/66: programming-2022: Fix typos.
Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2022 11:32:03 -0400 (EDT)

civodul pushed a commit to branch master
in repository maintenance.

commit 4cea83682bde8a686b2c6b454dcf7b3b6798bfcb
Author: Ludovic Courtès <ludo@gnu.org>
AuthorDate: Wed Apr 13 08:01:04 2022 +0200

    programming-2022: Fix typos.
    
    * doc/programming-2022/supply-chain.skb (Related Work): Fix typos.
---
 doc/programming-2022/supply-chain.skb | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/doc/programming-2022/supply-chain.skb 
b/doc/programming-2022/supply-chain.skb
index 2d2bf73..2e37095 100644
--- a/doc/programming-2022/supply-chain.skb
+++ b/doc/programming-2022/supply-chain.skb
@@ -1246,7 +1246,7 @@ verify whether a given commit is signed by a key that was 
authorized at
 the time of signature.  Another shortcoming is that the recommended
 method to update one’s local copy of the package repository is ,(emph
 [not]) Git but instead the rsync file synchronization protocol together
-with OpenPGP signatures of the files made with special-purpose a release
+with OpenPGP signatures of the files made with a special-purpose release
 key.])
 
       (p [Developers of OPAM, the package manager for the OCaml
@@ -1254,14 +1254,14 @@ language, adapted TUF for use with their Git-based 
package repository,
 later updated to write Conex ,(ref :bib 'mehnert2016:conex), a separate
 tool to authenticate OPAM repositories.  OPAM like Guix is a
 source-based distribution and its package repository is a Git repository
-containing “build recipe”.  To date, it appears that ,(tt [opam update])
+containing “build recipes”.  To date, it appears that ,(tt [opam update])
 itself does not authenticate repositories though; it is up to users and
 developers to run Conex.])
       
       (p [,(bold [Supply chain integrity.])
 The in-toto framework ,(ref :bib 'torresarias2019:intoto) can be thought of as 
a
 generalization of TUF; it aims at ensuring the integrity of complete
-software supply chains, taking into accounts the different steps that
+software supply chains, taking into account the different steps that
 comprise software supply chains in widespread use such as Debian’s.  In
 particular, it focuses on ,(emph [artifact flow integrity])—that
 artifacts created by a step cannot be altered before the next step.])



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