Re: “Building a Secure Software Supply Chain with GNU Guix”

[Jeremiah]

This is why things like SELinux exist, combine with separate binaries
for the functionality that impacts things outside of the store to
quickly minimize possible damage. If the binary can only create links
the possible damage is quite limited.

But the much more dangerous modification is much more subtle and can go
months to years without being noticed. To which there is no defense. As
there is no way to know when a person you trust will go crazy, turn evil
or flip the switch they planned many years ago.

Heck, the possible exploits that could be in the bootstrap seeds could
so subtle you wouldn't notice or even hidden in the kernel itself:
https://gitlab.com/bauen1/stage0-backdoor.git

Making reviews by third parties cheap, make forking cheap and never
assuming that anyone should be completely trusted is usually a secure
place to start.

And why the bootstrap seeds README starts with:
NEVER TRUST ANYTHING IN HERE

I could be evil after all

-Jeremiah