[bug#72457] What I mentioned above is verified boot.

[amano.kenji]

https://slimbootloader.github.io/security/verified-boot.html says

> A hash function is used to create a digest during build and saved as part of 
> the image which is then used to compare against the digest computed during 
> boot to make sure they are the same. The digest calculated during build and 
> saved as part of the image is trusted as its part of the trust chain.

> This method is used to verify components for which the digest can be computed 
> during SBL build time.

> Signature verification

> This method of verification is used for independently updateable components 
> like configuration data, IP firmware blobs, OS images, etc.

I wish this rewrite of bootloader subsystem allows the possibility of verified 
boot which doesn't have to be implemented now. Just make it possible to run 
services whenever there are changes to /boot.