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[Gzz-commits] gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu mastert...
From: |
Hermanni Hyytiälä |
Subject: |
[Gzz-commits] gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu mastert... |
Date: |
Mon, 03 Mar 2003 04:43:48 -0500 |
CVSROOT: /cvsroot/gzz
Module name: gzz
Changes by: Hermanni Hyytiälä <address@hidden> 03/03/03 04:43:47
Modified files:
Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu: masterthesis.tex
Log message:
More attack models
CVSWeb URLs:
http://savannah.gnu.org/cgi-bin/viewcvs/gzz/gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu/masterthesis.tex.diff?tr1=1.100&tr2=1.101&r1=text&r2=text
Patches:
Index: gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu/masterthesis.tex
diff -u gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu/masterthesis.tex:1.100
gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu/masterthesis.tex:1.101
--- gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu/masterthesis.tex:1.100 Mon Mar
3 03:47:01 2003
+++ gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu/masterthesis.tex Mon Mar 3
04:43:46 2003
@@ -1023,45 +1023,35 @@
Sybil attacks are always possible in Peer-to-Peer system except under extreme
and unrealistic assumptions of
resource parity and coordination among entities.
+In random fail-stop model, cited in \cite{naor03simpledht}, faulty peer is
deleted from the Peer-to-Peer system.
+The reason for faultyness of peer can be a software failure, a hostile attack,
or external threat such as virus or
+troijan. Closey related to fail-stop model is the Byzantine attack model
+\cite{357176}. Byzantine model can been seen more seveve than fail-stop model
as there are no restrictions over
+the behaviour of faulty peers. Partial, practical solution for byzantine
failures has been proposed by Castro et
+al \cite{296824}. General robustness properties of Peer-to-Peer system is able
to deal with software failures and hostile
+attack, but redundancy againts external threats is unknown. The reason for
this is that there are no experiences
+on these kinds of attacks. Possible solution would be distributed anti-virus
software, but much more intensive
+research is required for solve these problems.
+
+Spam generating attack is another known attack model againts Peer-to-Peer
system. In Spam
+attack, hostile or faulty peer may produce false information of the data.
Possible solution againts this attack
+is that peer should not trust to single entity. Instead peer should get
information from multiple entities and trust
+on majority's opinion. However, Spam attack is combined with Sybil attack,
obviously previously mentioned solution
+won't work. Again, more research is required to solve this attack model
reliability. Naor et al \cite{naor03simpledht}
+ has proposed a partial solution againts Spam attack with \emph{faulty} peers
(not hostile).
+
+Traditional overload of targeted peers is best known form of distrubuted
Denial of Service attack (DDoS). For example,
+hostile entity can attempt to burden targetted peers with garbage packets. As
a implication, peers may act
+incorrectly or stop working. DDoS attack may be very severe, especially if
rate of replication in Peer-to-Peer system
+is low. This may lead to data loss in the Peer-to-Peer system. Daswani et al
\cite{daswani02queryflooddos} has done
+research regarding to this subject. Authors suggest efficient load balancing
policies for Peer-to-Peer system in
+order to prevent massive system failures. Sit et al \cite{sit02securitycons}
suggests that identifier assignment
+algorithm for peers would assign identifier with respect to network topology
and replicas should be located
+physically to different locations.
-
-1) Sybil attack \cite{douceur02sybil}
-2) Fail-stop
-3) Spam generating model \cite{naor03simpledht}
-4) Byzantine problem \cite{357176}, p2p domain \cite{296824}
-5) General DDoS
-
-
-
-1) Sybil attack \cite{douceur02sybil}
-2) Fail-stop
-3) Spam generating model \cite{naor03simpledht}
-
-Decentralized, but structured
-a) Censorship Resistant Peer-to-Peer Content Addressable Networks
\cite{fiat02censorship},
--system is resilient to adversial and controlled attacks
--however, they assume that number of deleted peers is constant
--not effiecient methods for maintaining dynamic netoworks
-b) Dynamically Fault-Tolerant Content Addressable Networks
\cite{saia02dynamicfaultcontentnetwork}
--system is resilient to adversial and controlled attacks (partial support for
dynamic deletions, see below)
--however, still assume a constant number of participating peers
--not effiecient methods for maintaining dynamic netoworks
-c) Butterflies and Peer-to-Peer Networks \cite{datar02butterflies}
--system is resilient to adversial and controlled attacks
--support for dynamic deletions and dynamic number of participants
--not effiecient methods for maintaining dynamic netoworks
-
-Open problems, which remain to be addressed for fault tolerant decentralized,
but structured strategies
-
-a) Is it possible to and efficient and dynamic fault tolerant decentralized,
but structured system, which
-allows e.g. multiple rounds of adversary attack ?
-b) Could multi-butterflier be used in and efficient manner to construct a span
resistant network ?
-c) Are there lower bounds for average degree of nodes, query path length etc.
for a network that is
-fault tolerant to linear number of adversial faults ?
-
+\subsection{Data authenticity and integrity}
-\subsection{Data authenticity and integrity}
-Could we use SDSI/SPKI in our system (it's hierarchical), like in ConChord
\cite{ajmani02conchord}
-is there any other implementations of SDSI/SPKI-like systems ?
-SDSI/SPKI is not optimal for us, but somewhat working solution
- [Gzz-commits] gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu mastert..., Hermanni Hyytiälä, 2003/03/03
- [Gzz-commits] gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu mastert...,
Hermanni Hyytiälä <=
- [Gzz-commits] gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu mastert..., Hermanni Hyytiälä, 2003/03/03
- [Gzz-commits] gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu mastert..., Hermanni Hyytiälä, 2003/03/03
- [Gzz-commits] gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu mastert..., Hermanni Hyytiälä, 2003/03/03
- [Gzz-commits] gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu mastert..., Hermanni Hyytiälä, 2003/03/03
- [Gzz-commits] gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu mastert..., Hermanni Hyytiälä, 2003/03/04
- [Gzz-commits] gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu mastert..., Hermanni Hyytiälä, 2003/03/04
- [Gzz-commits] gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu mastert..., Hermanni Hyytiälä, 2003/03/04
- [Gzz-commits] gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu mastert..., Hermanni Hyytiälä, 2003/03/04
- [Gzz-commits] gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu mastert..., Hermanni Hyytiälä, 2003/03/04
- [Gzz-commits] gzz/Documentation/misc/hemppah-progradu mastert..., Hermanni Hyytiälä, 2003/03/04