Re: Challenge: Confinement

[Sam Mason]

On Tue, Aug 29, 2006 at 01:14:01PM +0200, Michal Suchanek wrote:
> The DRM providers are in fact several.
> 
> There is the chip provider that certifies by a key that the chip is
> indeed a valid TMP chip. There is nothing stopping him (or some of his
> employers/contractors) to make invalid chips or give away keys you
> could you to emulate a chip.
> 
> Sure it would harm their good name. But it turned out that providers
> of SSL certificates did not mind their good name that much.
> 
> Then there is a party that certifies that the OS is genuine and
> correct. The chip collects the OS signatures but you have to verify
> them somewhere.
> 
> Then there is a party that certifies the application. Not all
> applications would come with an OS so there will have to be some
> separate application certificates.

I'd just like to note that Jonathan's target for Coyotos is high security
systems which by definition (or my interpretation thereof) will be a
reasonably small and very tightly controlled set of computers.  This
sounds like an ideal application of TC as all of the above, potentially
conflicting, interests will be aligned towards protecting each individual
system from outside attack.  In the case of a successful attack against
a single computer TC will help the remainder of the system to recognise
this, ceasing communication with it and limiting the effect of the attack.

Contrast this with Hurd's target, that of a general purpose operating
system where the current target of TC is protecting the media industry
from their customers.  Here the above interests are not remotely aligned
as each group tries to get on with their lives at the expense of each
other, while trying to maintain the impression with the other groups
that they are behaving as they should be.

I do still believe that TC has a place in computers, but the main current
application, namely DRM, is not it.


  Sam