[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: [Qemu-arm] [PATCH v2 06/23] target/arm: Fix multiline comment syntax
|
From: |
Alex Bennée |
|
Subject: |
Re: [Qemu-arm] [PATCH v2 06/23] target/arm: Fix multiline comment syntax |
|
Date: |
Mon, 17 Jun 2019 12:40:05 +0100 |
|
User-agent: |
mu4e 1.3.2; emacs 26.1 |
Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <address@hidden> writes:
> Since commit 8c06fbdf36b checkpatch.pl enforce a new multiline
> comment syntax. Since we'll move this code around, fix its style
> first.
>
> Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <address@hidden>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <address@hidden>
> ---
> target/arm/helper.c | 213 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
> target/arm/op_helper.c | 27 ++++--
> 2 files changed, 160 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/target/arm/helper.c b/target/arm/helper.c
> index d3f3cb57d5..9a3766b759 100644
> --- a/target/arm/helper.c
> +++ b/target/arm/helper.c
> @@ -7531,7 +7531,8 @@ void HELPER(v7m_vlldm)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t fptr)
>
> uint32_t HELPER(v7m_tt)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t addr, uint32_t op)
> {
> - /* The TT instructions can be used by unprivileged code, but in
> + /*
> + * The TT instructions can be used by unprivileged code, but in
> * user-only emulation we don't have the MPU.
> * Luckily since we know we are NonSecure unprivileged (and that in
> * turn means that the A flag wasn't specified), all the bits in the
> @@ -7803,7 +7804,8 @@ static bool v7m_stack_write(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t addr,
> uint32_t value,
> return true;
>
> pend_fault:
> - /* By pending the exception at this point we are making
> + /*
> + * By pending the exception at this point we are making
> * the IMPDEF choice "overridden exceptions pended" (see the
> * MergeExcInfo() pseudocode). The other choice would be to not
> * pend them now and then make a choice about which to throw away
> @@ -7878,7 +7880,8 @@ static bool v7m_stack_read(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t *dest,
> uint32_t addr,
> return true;
>
> pend_fault:
> - /* By pending the exception at this point we are making
> + /*
> + * By pending the exception at this point we are making
> * the IMPDEF choice "overridden exceptions pended" (see the
> * MergeExcInfo() pseudocode). The other choice would be to not
> * pend them now and then make a choice about which to throw away
> @@ -7979,7 +7982,8 @@ void HELPER(v7m_preserve_fp_state)(CPUARMState *env)
> */
> }
>
> -/* Write to v7M CONTROL.SPSEL bit for the specified security bank.
> +/*
> + * Write to v7M CONTROL.SPSEL bit for the specified security bank.
> * This may change the current stack pointer between Main and Process
> * stack pointers if it is done for the CONTROL register for the current
> * security state.
> @@ -8007,7 +8011,8 @@ static void
> write_v7m_control_spsel_for_secstate(CPUARMState *env,
> }
> }
>
> -/* Write to v7M CONTROL.SPSEL bit. This may change the current
> +/*
> + * Write to v7M CONTROL.SPSEL bit. This may change the current
> * stack pointer between Main and Process stack pointers.
> */
> static void write_v7m_control_spsel(CPUARMState *env, bool new_spsel)
> @@ -8017,7 +8022,8 @@ static void write_v7m_control_spsel(CPUARMState *env,
> bool new_spsel)
>
> void write_v7m_exception(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t new_exc)
> {
> - /* Write a new value to v7m.exception, thus transitioning into or out
> + /*
> + * Write a new value to v7m.exception, thus transitioning into or out
> * of Handler mode; this may result in a change of active stack pointer.
> */
> bool new_is_psp, old_is_psp = v7m_using_psp(env);
> @@ -8043,7 +8049,8 @@ static void switch_v7m_security_state(CPUARMState *env,
> bool new_secstate)
> return;
> }
>
> - /* All the banked state is accessed by looking at env->v7m.secure
> + /*
> + * All the banked state is accessed by looking at env->v7m.secure
> * except for the stack pointer; rearrange the SP appropriately.
> */
> new_ss_msp = env->v7m.other_ss_msp;
> @@ -8070,7 +8077,8 @@ static void switch_v7m_security_state(CPUARMState *env,
> bool new_secstate)
>
> void HELPER(v7m_bxns)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t dest)
> {
> - /* Handle v7M BXNS:
> + /*
> + * Handle v7M BXNS:
> * - if the return value is a magic value, do exception return (like BX)
> * - otherwise bit 0 of the return value is the target security state
> */
> @@ -8085,7 +8093,8 @@ void HELPER(v7m_bxns)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t dest)
> }
>
> if (dest >= min_magic) {
> - /* This is an exception return magic value; put it where
> + /*
> + * This is an exception return magic value; put it where
> * do_v7m_exception_exit() expects and raise EXCEPTION_EXIT.
> * Note that if we ever add gen_ss_advance() singlestep support to
> * M profile this should count as an "instruction execution complete"
> @@ -8110,7 +8119,8 @@ void HELPER(v7m_bxns)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t dest)
>
> void HELPER(v7m_blxns)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t dest)
> {
> - /* Handle v7M BLXNS:
> + /*
> + * Handle v7M BLXNS:
> * - bit 0 of the destination address is the target security state
> */
>
> @@ -8123,7 +8133,8 @@ void HELPER(v7m_blxns)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t dest)
> assert(env->v7m.secure);
>
> if (dest & 1) {
> - /* target is Secure, so this is just a normal BLX,
> + /*
> + * Target is Secure, so this is just a normal BLX,
> * except that the low bit doesn't indicate Thumb/not.
> */
> env->regs[14] = nextinst;
> @@ -8154,7 +8165,8 @@ void HELPER(v7m_blxns)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t dest)
> env->regs[13] = sp;
> env->regs[14] = 0xfeffffff;
> if (arm_v7m_is_handler_mode(env)) {
> - /* Write a dummy value to IPSR, to avoid leaking the current secure
> + /*
> + * Write a dummy value to IPSR, to avoid leaking the current secure
> * exception number to non-secure code. This is guaranteed not
> * to cause write_v7m_exception() to actually change stacks.
> */
> @@ -8169,7 +8181,8 @@ void HELPER(v7m_blxns)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t dest)
> static uint32_t *get_v7m_sp_ptr(CPUARMState *env, bool secure, bool
> threadmode,
> bool spsel)
> {
> - /* Return a pointer to the location where we currently store the
> + /*
> + * Return a pointer to the location where we currently store the
> * stack pointer for the requested security state and thread mode.
> * This pointer will become invalid if the CPU state is updated
> * such that the stack pointers are switched around (eg changing
> @@ -8215,7 +8228,8 @@ static bool arm_v7m_load_vector(ARMCPU *cpu, int exc,
> bool targets_secure,
>
> mmu_idx = arm_v7m_mmu_idx_for_secstate_and_priv(env, targets_secure,
> true);
>
> - /* We don't do a get_phys_addr() here because the rules for vector
> + /*
> + * We don't do a get_phys_addr() here because the rules for vector
> * loads are special: they always use the default memory map, and
> * the default memory map permits reads from all addresses.
> * Since there's no easy way to pass through to pmsav8_mpu_lookup()
> @@ -8246,7 +8260,8 @@ static bool arm_v7m_load_vector(ARMCPU *cpu, int exc,
> bool targets_secure,
> return true;
>
> load_fail:
> - /* All vector table fetch fails are reported as HardFault, with
> + /*
> + * All vector table fetch fails are reported as HardFault, with
> * HFSR.VECTTBL and .FORCED set. (FORCED is set because
> * technically the underlying exception is a MemManage or BusFault
> * that is escalated to HardFault.) This is a terminal exception,
> @@ -8278,7 +8293,8 @@ static uint32_t v7m_integrity_sig(CPUARMState *env,
> uint32_t lr)
> static bool v7m_push_callee_stack(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t lr, bool dotailchain,
> bool ignore_faults)
> {
> - /* For v8M, push the callee-saves register part of the stack frame.
> + /*
> + * For v8M, push the callee-saves register part of the stack frame.
> * Compare the v8M pseudocode PushCalleeStack().
> * In the tailchaining case this may not be the current stack.
> */
> @@ -8329,7 +8345,8 @@ static bool v7m_push_callee_stack(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t
> lr, bool dotailchain,
> return true;
> }
>
> - /* Write as much of the stack frame as we can. A write failure may
> + /*
> + * Write as much of the stack frame as we can. A write failure may
> * cause us to pend a derived exception.
> */
> sig = v7m_integrity_sig(env, lr);
> @@ -8353,7 +8370,8 @@ static bool v7m_push_callee_stack(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t
> lr, bool dotailchain,
> static void v7m_exception_taken(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t lr, bool dotailchain,
> bool ignore_stackfaults)
> {
> - /* Do the "take the exception" parts of exception entry,
> + /*
> + * Do the "take the exception" parts of exception entry,
> * but not the pushing of state to the stack. This is
> * similar to the pseudocode ExceptionTaken() function.
> */
> @@ -8378,13 +8396,15 @@ static void v7m_exception_taken(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t
> lr, bool dotailchain,
> if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
> if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY) &&
> (lr & R_V7M_EXCRET_S_MASK)) {
> - /* The background code (the owner of the registers in the
> + /*
> + * The background code (the owner of the registers in the
> * exception frame) is Secure. This means it may either already
> * have or now needs to push callee-saves registers.
> */
> if (targets_secure) {
> if (dotailchain && !(lr & R_V7M_EXCRET_ES_MASK)) {
> - /* We took an exception from Secure to NonSecure
> + /*
> + * We took an exception from Secure to NonSecure
> * (which means the callee-saved registers got stacked)
> * and are now tailchaining to a Secure exception.
> * Clear DCRS so eventual return from this Secure
> @@ -8393,7 +8413,8 @@ static void v7m_exception_taken(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t
> lr, bool dotailchain,
> lr &= ~R_V7M_EXCRET_DCRS_MASK;
> }
> } else {
> - /* We're going to a non-secure exception; push the
> + /*
> + * We're going to a non-secure exception; push the
> * callee-saves registers to the stack now, if they're
> * not already saved.
> */
> @@ -8415,14 +8436,16 @@ static void v7m_exception_taken(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t
> lr, bool dotailchain,
> lr |= R_V7M_EXCRET_SPSEL_MASK;
> }
>
> - /* Clear registers if necessary to prevent non-secure exception
> + /*
> + * Clear registers if necessary to prevent non-secure exception
> * code being able to see register values from secure code.
> * Where register values become architecturally UNKNOWN we leave
> * them with their previous values.
> */
> if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY)) {
> if (!targets_secure) {
> - /* Always clear the caller-saved registers (they have been
> + /*
> + * Always clear the caller-saved registers (they have been
> * pushed to the stack earlier in v7m_push_stack()).
> * Clear callee-saved registers if the background code is
> * Secure (in which case these regs were saved in
> @@ -8443,7 +8466,8 @@ static void v7m_exception_taken(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t
> lr, bool dotailchain,
> }
>
> if (push_failed && !ignore_stackfaults) {
> - /* Derived exception on callee-saves register stacking:
> + /*
> + * Derived exception on callee-saves register stacking:
> * we might now want to take a different exception which
> * targets a different security state, so try again from the top.
> */
> @@ -8460,7 +8484,8 @@ static void v7m_exception_taken(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t
> lr, bool dotailchain,
> return;
> }
>
> - /* Now we've done everything that might cause a derived exception
> + /*
> + * Now we've done everything that might cause a derived exception
> * we can go ahead and activate whichever exception we're going to
> * take (which might now be the derived exception).
> */
> @@ -8663,7 +8688,8 @@ void HELPER(v7m_vlldm)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t fptr)
>
> static bool v7m_push_stack(ARMCPU *cpu)
> {
> - /* Do the "set up stack frame" part of exception entry,
> + /*
> + * Do the "set up stack frame" part of exception entry,
> * similar to pseudocode PushStack().
> * Return true if we generate a derived exception (and so
> * should ignore further stack faults trying to process
> @@ -8731,7 +8757,8 @@ static bool v7m_push_stack(ARMCPU *cpu)
> }
> }
>
> - /* Write as much of the stack frame as we can. If we fail a stack
> + /*
> + * Write as much of the stack frame as we can. If we fail a stack
> * write this will result in a derived exception being pended
> * (which may be taken in preference to the one we started with
> * if it has higher priority).
> @@ -8848,7 +8875,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
> bool ftype;
> bool restore_s16_s31;
>
> - /* If we're not in Handler mode then jumps to magic exception-exit
> + /*
> + * If we're not in Handler mode then jumps to magic exception-exit
> * addresses don't have magic behaviour. However for the v8M
> * security extensions the magic secure-function-return has to
> * work in thread mode too, so to avoid doing an extra check in
> @@ -8862,7 +8890,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
> return;
> }
>
> - /* In the spec pseudocode ExceptionReturn() is called directly
> + /*
> + * In the spec pseudocode ExceptionReturn() is called directly
> * from BXWritePC() and gets the full target PC value including
> * bit zero. In QEMU's implementation we treat it as a normal
> * jump-to-register (which is then caught later on), and so split
> @@ -8895,7 +8924,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
> }
>
> if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY)) {
> - /* EXC_RETURN.ES validation check (R_SMFL). We must do this before
> + /*
> + * EXC_RETURN.ES validation check (R_SMFL). We must do this before
> * we pick which FAULTMASK to clear.
> */
> if (!env->v7m.secure &&
> @@ -8909,7 +8939,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
> }
>
> if (env->v7m.exception != ARMV7M_EXCP_NMI) {
> - /* Auto-clear FAULTMASK on return from other than NMI.
> + /*
> + * Auto-clear FAULTMASK on return from other than NMI.
> * If the security extension is implemented then this only
> * happens if the raw execution priority is >= 0; the
> * value of the ES bit in the exception return value indicates
> @@ -8934,7 +8965,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
> /* still an irq active now */
> break;
> case 1:
> - /* we returned to base exception level, no nesting.
> + /*
> + * We returned to base exception level, no nesting.
> * (In the pseudocode this is written using "NestedActivation != 1"
> * where we have 'rettobase == false'.)
> */
> @@ -8951,7 +8983,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
>
> if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
> if (!arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY)) {
> - /* UNPREDICTABLE if S == 1 or DCRS == 0 or ES == 1 (R_XLCP);
> + /*
> + * UNPREDICTABLE if S == 1 or DCRS == 0 or ES == 1 (R_XLCP);
> * we choose to take the UsageFault.
> */
> if ((excret & R_V7M_EXCRET_S_MASK) ||
> @@ -8970,7 +9003,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
> break;
> case 13: /* Return to Thread using Process stack */
> case 9: /* Return to Thread using Main stack */
> - /* We only need to check NONBASETHRDENA for v7M, because in
> + /*
> + * We only need to check NONBASETHRDENA for v7M, because in
> * v8M this bit does not exist (it is RES1).
> */
> if (!rettobase &&
> @@ -9028,7 +9062,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
> }
>
> if (ufault) {
> - /* Bad exception return: instead of popping the exception
> + /*
> + * Bad exception return: instead of popping the exception
> * stack, directly take a usage fault on the current stack.
> */
> env->v7m.cfsr[env->v7m.secure] |= R_V7M_CFSR_INVPC_MASK;
> @@ -9058,7 +9093,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
> switch_v7m_security_state(env, return_to_secure);
>
> {
> - /* The stack pointer we should be reading the exception frame from
> + /*
> + * The stack pointer we should be reading the exception frame from
> * depends on bits in the magic exception return type value (and
> * for v8M isn't necessarily the stack pointer we will eventually
> * end up resuming execution with). Get a pointer to the location
> @@ -9131,7 +9167,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
> v7m_stack_read(cpu, &xpsr, frameptr + 0x1c, mmu_idx);
>
> if (!pop_ok) {
> - /* v7m_stack_read() pended a fault, so take it (as a tail
> + /*
> + * v7m_stack_read() pended a fault, so take it (as a tail
> * chained exception on the same stack frame)
> */
> qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT, "...derived exception on
> unstacking\n");
> @@ -9139,7 +9176,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
> return;
> }
>
> - /* Returning from an exception with a PC with bit 0 set is defined
> + /*
> + * Returning from an exception with a PC with bit 0 set is defined
> * behaviour on v8M (bit 0 is ignored), but for v7M it was specified
> * to be UNPREDICTABLE. In practice actual v7M hardware seems to
> ignore
> * the lsbit, and there are several RTOSes out there which
> incorrectly
> @@ -9157,13 +9195,15 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
> }
>
> if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
> - /* For v8M we have to check whether the xPSR exception field
> + /*
> + * For v8M we have to check whether the xPSR exception field
> * matches the EXCRET value for return to handler/thread
> * before we commit to changing the SP and xPSR.
> */
> bool will_be_handler = (xpsr & XPSR_EXCP) != 0;
> if (return_to_handler != will_be_handler) {
> - /* Take an INVPC UsageFault on the current stack.
> + /*
> + * Take an INVPC UsageFault on the current stack.
> * By this point we will have switched to the security state
> * for the background state, so this UsageFault will target
> * that state.
> @@ -9278,7 +9318,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
> frameptr += 0x40;
> }
> }
> - /* Undo stack alignment (the SPREALIGN bit indicates that the
> original
> + /*
> + * Undo stack alignment (the SPREALIGN bit indicates that the
> original
> * pre-exception SP was not 8-aligned and we added a padding word to
> * align it, so we undo this by ORing in the bit that increases it
> * from the current 8-aligned value to the 8-unaligned value.
> (Adding 4
> @@ -9304,13 +9345,15 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
> V7M_CONTROL, SFPA, sfpa);
> }
>
> - /* The restored xPSR exception field will be zero if we're
> + /*
> + * The restored xPSR exception field will be zero if we're
> * resuming in Thread mode. If that doesn't match what the
> * exception return excret specified then this is a UsageFault.
> * v7M requires we make this check here; v8M did it earlier.
> */
> if (return_to_handler != arm_v7m_is_handler_mode(env)) {
> - /* Take an INVPC UsageFault by pushing the stack again;
> + /*
> + * Take an INVPC UsageFault by pushing the stack again;
> * we know we're v7M so this is never a Secure UsageFault.
> */
> bool ignore_stackfaults;
> @@ -9332,7 +9375,8 @@ static void do_v7m_exception_exit(ARMCPU *cpu)
>
> static bool do_v7m_function_return(ARMCPU *cpu)
> {
> - /* v8M security extensions magic function return.
> + /*
> + * v8M security extensions magic function return.
> * We may either:
> * (1) throw an exception (longjump)
> * (2) return true if we successfully handled the function return
> @@ -9362,7 +9406,8 @@ static bool do_v7m_function_return(ARMCPU *cpu)
> frame_sp_p = get_v7m_sp_ptr(env, true, threadmode, spsel);
> frameptr = *frame_sp_p;
>
> - /* These loads may throw an exception (for MPU faults). We want to
> + /*
> + * These loads may throw an exception (for MPU faults). We want to
> * do them as secure, so work out what MMU index that is.
> */
> mmu_idx = arm_v7m_mmu_idx_for_secstate(env, true);
> @@ -9443,7 +9488,8 @@ static void arm_log_exception(int idx)
> static bool v7m_read_half_insn(ARMCPU *cpu, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
> uint32_t addr, uint16_t *insn)
> {
> - /* Load a 16-bit portion of a v7M instruction, returning true on success,
> + /*
> + * Load a 16-bit portion of a v7M instruction, returning true on success,
> * or false on failure (in which case we will have pended the appropriate
> * exception).
> * We need to do the instruction fetch's MPU and SAU checks
> @@ -9466,7 +9512,8 @@ static bool v7m_read_half_insn(ARMCPU *cpu, ARMMMUIdx
> mmu_idx,
>
> v8m_security_lookup(env, addr, MMU_INST_FETCH, mmu_idx, &sattrs);
> if (!sattrs.nsc || sattrs.ns) {
> - /* This must be the second half of the insn, and it straddles a
> + /*
> + * This must be the second half of the insn, and it straddles a
> * region boundary with the second half not being S&NSC.
> */
> env->v7m.sfsr |= R_V7M_SFSR_INVEP_MASK;
> @@ -9496,7 +9543,8 @@ static bool v7m_read_half_insn(ARMCPU *cpu, ARMMMUIdx
> mmu_idx,
>
> static bool v7m_handle_execute_nsc(ARMCPU *cpu)
> {
> - /* Check whether this attempt to execute code in a Secure & NS-Callable
> + /*
> + * Check whether this attempt to execute code in a Secure & NS-Callable
> * memory region is for an SG instruction; if so, then emulate the
> * effect of the SG instruction and return true. Otherwise pend
> * the correct kind of exception and return false.
> @@ -9505,7 +9553,8 @@ static bool v7m_handle_execute_nsc(ARMCPU *cpu)
> ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx;
> uint16_t insn;
>
> - /* We should never get here unless get_phys_addr_pmsav8() caused
> + /*
> + * We should never get here unless get_phys_addr_pmsav8() caused
> * an exception for NS executing in S&NSC memory.
> */
> assert(!env->v7m.secure);
> @@ -9523,7 +9572,8 @@ static bool v7m_handle_execute_nsc(ARMCPU *cpu)
> }
>
> if (insn != 0xe97f) {
> - /* Not an SG instruction first half (we choose the IMPDEF
> + /*
> + * Not an SG instruction first half (we choose the IMPDEF
> * early-SG-check option).
> */
> goto gen_invep;
> @@ -9534,13 +9584,15 @@ static bool v7m_handle_execute_nsc(ARMCPU *cpu)
> }
>
> if (insn != 0xe97f) {
> - /* Not an SG instruction second half (yes, both halves of the SG
> + /*
> + * Not an SG instruction second half (yes, both halves of the SG
> * insn have the same hex value)
> */
> goto gen_invep;
> }
>
> - /* OK, we have confirmed that we really have an SG instruction.
> + /*
> + * OK, we have confirmed that we really have an SG instruction.
> * We know we're NS in S memory so don't need to repeat those checks.
> */
> qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT, "...really an SG instruction at 0x%08" PRIx32
> @@ -9569,8 +9621,10 @@ void arm_v7m_cpu_do_interrupt(CPUState *cs)
>
> arm_log_exception(cs->exception_index);
>
> - /* For exceptions we just mark as pending on the NVIC, and let that
> - handle it. */
> + /*
> + * For exceptions we just mark as pending on the NVIC, and let that
> + * handle it.
> + */
> switch (cs->exception_index) {
> case EXCP_UDEF:
> armv7m_nvic_set_pending(env->nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_USAGE,
> env->v7m.secure);
> @@ -9616,13 +9670,15 @@ void arm_v7m_cpu_do_interrupt(CPUState *cs)
> break;
> case EXCP_PREFETCH_ABORT:
> case EXCP_DATA_ABORT:
> - /* Note that for M profile we don't have a guest facing FSR, but
> + /*
> + * Note that for M profile we don't have a guest facing FSR, but
> * the env->exception.fsr will be populated by the code that
> * raises the fault, in the A profile short-descriptor format.
> */
> switch (env->exception.fsr & 0xf) {
> case M_FAKE_FSR_NSC_EXEC:
> - /* Exception generated when we try to execute code at an address
> + /*
> + * Exception generated when we try to execute code at an address
> * which is marked as Secure & Non-Secure Callable and the CPU
> * is in the Non-Secure state. The only instruction which can
> * be executed like this is SG (and that only if both halves of
> @@ -9635,7 +9691,8 @@ void arm_v7m_cpu_do_interrupt(CPUState *cs)
> }
> break;
> case M_FAKE_FSR_SFAULT:
> - /* Various flavours of SecureFault for attempts to execute or
> + /*
> + * Various flavours of SecureFault for attempts to execute or
> * access data in the wrong security state.
> */
> switch (cs->exception_index) {
> @@ -9677,7 +9734,8 @@ void arm_v7m_cpu_do_interrupt(CPUState *cs)
> armv7m_nvic_set_pending(env->nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_BUS, false);
> break;
> default:
> - /* All other FSR values are either MPU faults or "can't happen
> + /*
> + * All other FSR values are either MPU faults or "can't happen
> * for M profile" cases.
> */
> switch (cs->exception_index) {
> @@ -9743,7 +9801,8 @@ void arm_v7m_cpu_do_interrupt(CPUState *cs)
> if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
> lr = R_V7M_EXCRET_RES1_MASK |
> R_V7M_EXCRET_DCRS_MASK;
> - /* The S bit indicates whether we should return to Secure
> + /*
> + * The S bit indicates whether we should return to Secure
> * or NonSecure (ie our current state).
> * The ES bit indicates whether we're taking this exception
> * to Secure or NonSecure (ie our target state). We set it
> @@ -12760,7 +12819,8 @@ uint32_t HELPER(v7m_mrs)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t
> reg)
> return value;
> }
> case 0x94: /* CONTROL_NS */
> - /* We have to handle this here because unprivileged Secure code
> + /*
> + * We have to handle this here because unprivileged Secure code
> * can read the NS CONTROL register.
> */
> if (!env->v7m.secure) {
> @@ -12813,7 +12873,8 @@ uint32_t HELPER(v7m_mrs)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t
> reg)
> return env->v7m.faultmask[M_REG_NS];
> case 0x98: /* SP_NS */
> {
> - /* This gives the non-secure SP selected based on whether we're
> + /*
> + * This gives the non-secure SP selected based on whether we're
> * currently in handler mode or not, using the NS CONTROL.SPSEL.
> */
> bool spsel = env->v7m.control[M_REG_NS] &
> R_V7M_CONTROL_SPSEL_MASK;
> @@ -12864,7 +12925,8 @@ uint32_t HELPER(v7m_mrs)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t
> reg)
>
> void HELPER(v7m_msr)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t maskreg, uint32_t val)
> {
> - /* We're passed bits [11..0] of the instruction; extract
> + /*
> + * We're passed bits [11..0] of the instruction; extract
> * SYSm and the mask bits.
> * Invalid combinations of SYSm and mask are UNPREDICTABLE;
> * we choose to treat them as if the mask bits were valid.
> @@ -12950,7 +13012,8 @@ void HELPER(v7m_msr)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t
> maskreg, uint32_t val)
> return;
> case 0x98: /* SP_NS */
> {
> - /* This gives the non-secure SP selected based on whether we're
> + /*
> + * This gives the non-secure SP selected based on whether we're
> * currently in handler mode or not, using the NS CONTROL.SPSEL.
> */
> bool spsel = env->v7m.control[M_REG_NS] &
> R_V7M_CONTROL_SPSEL_MASK;
> @@ -13111,7 +13174,8 @@ uint32_t HELPER(v7m_tt)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t
> addr, uint32_t op)
> bool targetsec = env->v7m.secure;
> bool is_subpage;
>
> - /* Work out what the security state and privilege level we're
> + /*
> + * Work out what the security state and privilege level we're
> * interested in is...
> */
> if (alt) {
> @@ -13128,12 +13192,14 @@ uint32_t HELPER(v7m_tt)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t
> addr, uint32_t op)
> /* ...and then figure out which MMU index this is */
> mmu_idx = arm_v7m_mmu_idx_for_secstate_and_priv(env, targetsec,
> targetpriv);
>
> - /* We know that the MPU and SAU don't care about the access type
> + /*
> + * We know that the MPU and SAU don't care about the access type
> * for our purposes beyond that we don't want to claim to be
> * an insn fetch, so we arbitrarily call this a read.
> */
>
> - /* MPU region info only available for privileged or if
> + /*
> + * MPU region info only available for privileged or if
> * inspecting the other MPU state.
> */
> if (arm_current_el(env) != 0 || alt) {
> @@ -13238,7 +13304,8 @@ bool arm_cpu_tlb_fill(CPUState *cs, vaddr address,
> int size,
>
> void HELPER(dc_zva)(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t vaddr_in)
> {
> - /* Implement DC ZVA, which zeroes a fixed-length block of memory.
> + /*
> + * Implement DC ZVA, which zeroes a fixed-length block of memory.
> * Note that we do not implement the (architecturally mandated)
> * alignment fault for attempts to use this on Device memory
> * (which matches the usual QEMU behaviour of not implementing either
> @@ -13251,7 +13318,8 @@ void HELPER(dc_zva)(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t
> vaddr_in)
>
> #ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
> {
> - /* Slightly awkwardly, QEMU's TARGET_PAGE_SIZE may be less than
> + /*
> + * Slightly awkwardly, QEMU's TARGET_PAGE_SIZE may be less than
> * the block size so we might have to do more than one TLB lookup.
> * We know that in fact for any v8 CPU the page size is at least 4K
> * and the block size must be 2K or less, but TARGET_PAGE_SIZE is
> only
> @@ -13278,7 +13346,8 @@ void HELPER(dc_zva)(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t
> vaddr_in)
> }
> }
> if (i == maxidx) {
> - /* If it's all in the TLB it's fair game for just writing to;
> + /*
> + * If it's all in the TLB it's fair game for just writing to;
> * we know we don't need to update dirty status, etc.
> */
> for (i = 0; i < maxidx - 1; i++) {
> @@ -13287,7 +13356,8 @@ void HELPER(dc_zva)(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t
> vaddr_in)
> memset(hostaddr[i], 0, blocklen - (i * TARGET_PAGE_SIZE));
> return;
> }
> - /* OK, try a store and see if we can populate the tlb. This
> + /*
> + * OK, try a store and see if we can populate the tlb. This
> * might cause an exception if the memory isn't writable,
> * in which case we will longjmp out of here. We must for
> * this purpose use the actual register value passed to us
> @@ -13303,7 +13373,8 @@ void HELPER(dc_zva)(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t
> vaddr_in)
> }
> }
>
> - /* Slow path (probably attempt to do this to an I/O device or
> + /*
> + * Slow path (probably attempt to do this to an I/O device or
> * similar, or clearing of a block of code we have translations
> * cached for). Just do a series of byte writes as the architecture
> * demands. It's not worth trying to use a cpu_physical_memory_map(),
> diff --git a/target/arm/op_helper.c b/target/arm/op_helper.c
> index 4db254876d..db4254a67b 100644
> --- a/target/arm/op_helper.c
> +++ b/target/arm/op_helper.c
> @@ -970,7 +970,8 @@ static bool linked_bp_matches(ARMCPU *cpu, int lbn)
> int bt;
> uint32_t contextidr;
>
> - /* Links to unimplemented or non-context aware breakpoints are
> + /*
> + * Links to unimplemented or non-context aware breakpoints are
> * CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE: either behave as if disabled, or
> * as if linked to an UNKNOWN context-aware breakpoint (in which
> * case DBGWCR<n>_EL1.LBN must indicate that breakpoint).
> @@ -989,7 +990,8 @@ static bool linked_bp_matches(ARMCPU *cpu, int lbn)
>
> bt = extract64(bcr, 20, 4);
>
> - /* We match the whole register even if this is AArch32 using the
> + /*
> + * We match the whole register even if this is AArch32 using the
> * short descriptor format (in which case it holds both PROCID and ASID),
> * since we don't implement the optional v7 context ID masking.
> */
> @@ -1006,7 +1008,8 @@ static bool linked_bp_matches(ARMCPU *cpu, int lbn)
> case 9: /* linked VMID match (reserved if no EL2) */
> case 11: /* linked context ID and VMID match (reserved if no EL2) */
> default:
> - /* Links to Unlinked context breakpoints must generate no
> + /*
> + * Links to Unlinked context breakpoints must generate no
> * events; we choose to do the same for reserved values too.
> */
> return false;
> @@ -1020,7 +1023,8 @@ static bool bp_wp_matches(ARMCPU *cpu, int n, bool
> is_wp)
> CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
> uint64_t cr;
> int pac, hmc, ssc, wt, lbn;
> - /* Note that for watchpoints the check is against the CPU security
> + /*
> + * Note that for watchpoints the check is against the CPU security
> * state, not the S/NS attribute on the offending data access.
> */
> bool is_secure = arm_is_secure(env);
> @@ -1034,7 +1038,8 @@ static bool bp_wp_matches(ARMCPU *cpu, int n, bool
> is_wp)
> }
> cr = env->cp15.dbgwcr[n];
> if (wp->hitattrs.user) {
> - /* The LDRT/STRT/LDT/STT "unprivileged access" instructions
> should
> + /*
> + * The LDRT/STRT/LDT/STT "unprivileged access" instructions
> should
> * match watchpoints as if they were accesses done at EL0, even
> if
> * the CPU is at EL1 or higher.
> */
> @@ -1048,7 +1053,8 @@ static bool bp_wp_matches(ARMCPU *cpu, int n, bool
> is_wp)
> }
> cr = env->cp15.dbgbcr[n];
> }
> - /* The WATCHPOINT_HIT flag guarantees us that the watchpoint is
> + /*
> + * The WATCHPOINT_HIT flag guarantees us that the watchpoint is
> * enabled and that the address and access type match; for breakpoints
> * we know the address matched; check the remaining fields, including
> * linked breakpoints. We rely on WCR and BCR having the same layout
> @@ -1116,7 +1122,8 @@ static bool check_watchpoints(ARMCPU *cpu)
> CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
> int n;
>
> - /* If watchpoints are disabled globally or we can't take debug
> + /*
> + * If watchpoints are disabled globally or we can't take debug
> * exceptions here then watchpoint firings are ignored.
> */
> if (extract32(env->cp15.mdscr_el1, 15, 1) == 0
> @@ -1164,7 +1171,8 @@ void HELPER(check_breakpoints)(CPUARMState *env)
>
> bool arm_debug_check_watchpoint(CPUState *cs, CPUWatchpoint *wp)
> {
> - /* Called by core code when a CPU watchpoint fires; need to check if this
> + /*
> + * Called by core code when a CPU watchpoint fires; need to check if this
> * is also an architectural watchpoint match.
> */
> ARMCPU *cpu = ARM_CPU(cs);
> @@ -1177,7 +1185,8 @@ vaddr arm_adjust_watchpoint_address(CPUState *cs, vaddr
> addr, int len)
> ARMCPU *cpu = ARM_CPU(cs);
> CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
>
> - /* In BE32 system mode, target memory is stored byteswapped (on a
> + /*
> + * In BE32 system mode, target memory is stored byteswapped (on a
> * little-endian host system), and by the time we reach here (via an
> * opcode helper) the addresses of subword accesses have been adjusted
> * to account for that, which means that watchpoints will not match.
--
Alex Bennée
- Re: [Qemu-arm] [PATCH v2 03/23] target/arm: Makefile cleanup (KVM), (continued)
- [Qemu-arm] [PATCH v2 05/23] target/arm: Add copyright boilerplate, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé, 2019/06/15
- [Qemu-arm] [PATCH v2 04/23] target/arm: Makefile cleanup (softmmu), Philippe Mathieu-Daudé, 2019/06/15
- [Qemu-arm] [PATCH v2 07/23] target/arm: Declare some function publicly, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé, 2019/06/15
- [Qemu-arm] [PATCH v2 09/23] target/arm: Move code around, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé, 2019/06/15
- [Qemu-arm] [PATCH v2 06/23] target/arm: Fix multiline comment syntax, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé, 2019/06/15
- Re: [Qemu-arm] [PATCH v2 06/23] target/arm: Fix multiline comment syntax,
Alex Bennée <=
- [Qemu-arm] [PATCH v2 10/23] target/arm: Move the v7-M Security State helpers to v7m_helper, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé, 2019/06/15
- [Qemu-arm] [PATCH v2 11/23] target/arm: Declare v7m_cpacr_pass() publicly, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé, 2019/06/15
- [Qemu-arm] [PATCH v2 14/23] target/arm: Move the DC ZVA helper into op_helper, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé, 2019/06/15
- [Qemu-arm] [PATCH v2 08/23] target/arm: Move all v7m insn helpers into their own file, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé, 2019/06/15
- [Qemu-arm] [PATCH v2 13/23] target/arm: Make the v7-M Security State routines, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé, 2019/06/15