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Re: [PATCH v3 0/9] Generalize memory encryption models
From: |
David Hildenbrand |
Subject: |
Re: [PATCH v3 0/9] Generalize memory encryption models |
Date: |
Fri, 19 Jun 2020 11:56:49 +0200 |
User-agent: |
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.8.0 |
>> "host-trust-limitation" sounds like "I am the hypervisor, I configure
>> limited trust into myself". Also, "untrusted-host" would be a little bit
>> nicer (I think trust is a black/white thing).
>>
>> However, once we have multiple options to protect a guest (memory
>> encryption, unmapping guest pages ,...) the name will no longer really
>> suffice to configure QEMU, no?
>
> Hm... we could have a property that accepts bits indicating where the
> actual limitation lies. Different parts of the code could then make
> more fine-grained decisions of what needs to be done. Feels a bit
> overengineered today; but maybe there's already stuff with different
> semantics in the pipeline somewhere?
>
>>
>>> For now this series covers just AMD SEV and POWER PEF. I'm hoping it
>>> can be extended to cover the Intel and s390 mechanisms as well,
>>> though.
>>
>> The only approach on s390x to not glue command line properties to the
>> cpu model would be to remove the CPU model feature and replace it by the
>> command line parameter. But that would, of course, be an incompatible break.
>
> Yuck.
>
> We still need to provide the cpu feature to the *guest* in any case, no?
Yeah, but that could be wired up internally. Wouldn't consider it clean,
though (I second the "overengineered" above).
--
Thanks,
David / dhildenb
- Re: [PATCH v3 9/9] host trust limitation: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests, (continued)
- Re: [PATCH v3 9/9] host trust limitation: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests, David Gibson, 2020/06/19
- Re: [PATCH v3 9/9] host trust limitation: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests, Daniel P . Berrangé, 2020/06/19
- Re: [PATCH v3 9/9] host trust limitation: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests, David Gibson, 2020/06/20
- Re: [PATCH v3 9/9] host trust limitation: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests, Daniel P . Berrangé, 2020/06/22
- Re: [PATCH v3 9/9] host trust limitation: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests, David Gibson, 2020/06/25
[PATCH v3 7/9] spapr: Add PEF based host trust limitation, David Gibson, 2020/06/18
[PATCH v3 6/9] host trust limitation: Add Error ** to HostTrustLimitation::kvm_init, David Gibson, 2020/06/18
Re: [PATCH v3 0/9] Generalize memory encryption models, no-reply, 2020/06/18
Re: [PATCH v3 0/9] Generalize memory encryption models, David Hildenbrand, 2020/06/19
- Re: [PATCH v3 0/9] Generalize memory encryption models, Cornelia Huck, 2020/06/19
- Re: [PATCH v3 0/9] Generalize memory encryption models,
David Hildenbrand <=
- Re: [PATCH v3 0/9] Generalize memory encryption models, Cornelia Huck, 2020/06/19
- Re: [PATCH v3 0/9] Generalize memory encryption models, David Hildenbrand, 2020/06/19
- Re: [PATCH v3 0/9] Generalize memory encryption models, Cornelia Huck, 2020/06/22
- Re: [PATCH v3 0/9] Generalize memory encryption models, David Gibson, 2020/06/25
- Re: [PATCH v3 0/9] Generalize memory encryption models, David Hildenbrand, 2020/06/25
- Re: [PATCH v3 0/9] Generalize memory encryption models, David Gibson, 2020/06/26
- Re: [PATCH v3 0/9] Generalize memory encryption models, David Hildenbrand, 2020/06/26
- Re: [PATCH v3 0/9] Generalize memory encryption models, Janosch Frank, 2020/06/26
- Re: [PATCH v3 0/9] Generalize memory encryption models, Daniel P . Berrangé, 2020/06/26
- Re: [PATCH v3 0/9] Generalize memory encryption models, Janosch Frank, 2020/06/26