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Re: [Sks-devel] Launching a new keyserver on keys.openpgp.org!
From: |
Valentin Sundermann |
Subject: |
Re: [Sks-devel] Launching a new keyserver on keys.openpgp.org! |
Date: |
Wed, 19 Jun 2019 17:01:07 +0200 |
User-agent: |
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/60.7.1 |
> That doesn't seem likely to work. AIUI the sks recon protocol doesn't just
> ensure that all members of the network have a copy of every key but
> that they have the same version of each key. If the recon adapter
> only deals in stripped keys then the reconciliation could never finally
> succede and I suspect that an SKS server connecting to it would
> be launching a DOS attack on itself.
Oh, didn't know that. Do you think it's possible to store this state /
key versions without storing the identity parts? E.g. through keeping
only hashes of it?
Would be more complex than I anticipated and might not be possible at
all, but I'd prefer not having to operate an SKS instance next to the
hagrid one :)
Thanks,
Valentin
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