[Top][All Lists]

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [Taler] Support for payer-trustlessness and merchant-auditing

From: Jeff Burdges
Subject: Re: [Taler] Support for payer-trustlessness and merchant-auditing
Date: Mon, 18 Sep 2017 23:01:50 +0200


You cannot naively use multi-signature bitcoin wallets with Taler
because they would break the anonymity and increase costs.  

In BOLT, there are zero-knowledge proof schemes to admit a fair exchange
like property similar to what you describe.  Yet, these sacrifice
anonymity because if you tear down a payment channel the payer gets
exposed, so BOLT only really works with ZCash where this attack reveals

It's worth clarifying the trust the customer and merchant place in the
exchange : 

In aggregate, the customers and merchants trust the exchange to hold
roughly the same total value, excluding money the customers get
returned.  We expect customers will hold their funds with the exchange
for far longer periods however, while merchants will receive their SEPA,
ACH, BTC, etc. payment within a day or so.  It's mostly the customers'
money the auditor watches. 

Yet conversely, each customer has a business relationship with the
exchange they pick, possibly their own bank, while merchants are asked
to trust the exchange picked by the customer.  It's the auditor that
gives the merchant confidence in the exchange, thereby allowing the
merchant to do fulfillment quickly. 


Attachment: signature.asc
Description: This is a digitally signed message part

reply via email to

[Prev in Thread] Current Thread [Next in Thread]