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Re: [Gnumed-devel] thanks re mimencode
From: |
Karsten Hilbert |
Subject: |
Re: [Gnumed-devel] thanks re mimencode |
Date: |
Sun, 12 May 2002 14:40:25 +0200 |
User-agent: |
Mutt/1.3.22.1i |
> Does that include firewall servers, e.g. which say receive in http some
> embedded protocol ( e.g. soap) , which does some validation of received
> requests, then reconstructs requests , then forwards to the real server,
> which is on a different network ( the intranet lan) .
> Requests to the proxy firewall on the postgresql port aren't forwarded,
> but could be logged.
Essentially this is a cleverly conceiled variant of the
three-tier system Horst talked about earlier thinly veiled in
the cloth of security proxying.
So, yes, you could filter all incoming traffic and apply
arbitrary rules to it but, no, you can't stop someone with
physical access to the proxied postgresql server from easily
rooting the box.
Karsten
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