Re: GRUB hardened boot framework

[Robert Millan]

On Sat, Feb 28, 2009 at 12:18:17AM +0100, phcoder wrote:
>> If the code that does the authentication is loaded from the encrypted 
>> partition,
>> without being checked, this is true, but we assume, that core.img is already
>> loaded (and checked), so the authentication code is not on the encrypted
>> partition, and can detect any tampering.
> As far as I understood Robert Millan was suggesting that just encrypting  
>  (but not verifying) your kernel is enough. I wanted to show wha it isn't

Fair enough.  My point is that we don't need overcomplicated mechanisms to
measure every module, config file or component separately.  After core.img
is verified/loaded, it's much simpler to handle the rest at this layer
below the filesystem, which doesn't require significant redesign of how
GRUB works.

-- 
Robert Millan

  The DRM opt-in fallacy: "Your data belongs to us. We will decide when (and
  how) you may access your data; but nobody's threatening your freedom: we
  still allow you to remove your data and not access it at all."