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Re: [Sks-devel] Proposal: Start verifying self-signatures


From: Alain Wolf
Subject: Re: [Sks-devel] Proposal: Start verifying self-signatures
Date: Sun, 17 May 2015 23:54:53 +0200
User-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:31.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/31.6.0

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Am 17.05.2015 um 23:29 schrieb Daniel Roesler:
> On May 17, 2015, Kristian Fiskerstrand wrote:
>>> 2. Prevents denial of service attacks that allows Mallory to
>>> spam a bunch of new subkeys, user ids, or huge images onto a
>>> public key.
> 
>> Please elaborate on how this is a DoS, I can see it being
>> un-appealing, but for it to qualify as a DoS the bar is higher
>> than that.
> 
> A User Attribute subpacket can be up to 256^4 bytes long[1],
> which means that a someone can upload a 4.2 GB jpeg onto your
> public key and then when gpg --recv-key tries to retreive your
> public key, it will have download a huge, overbloated file that
> you did not add yourself.
> 

If you have Nginx in front of your SKS, uploads are limited to 1 MB by
default or 8 MB if you follow Matt Rudes installation guide.

SKS itself seems to have a hard-coded 5 MB limit (wserver.ml line 174).


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