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Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH-for-4.2] tracing: Allow to tune tracing opti


From: Stefan Hajnoczi
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC PATCH-for-4.2] tracing: Allow to tune tracing options via the environment
Date: Thu, 4 Jul 2019 11:24:57 +0100
User-agent: Mutt/1.12.0 (2019-05-25)

On Wed, Jul 03, 2019 at 06:25:01PM +0100, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 03, 2019 at 07:10:05PM +0200, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé wrote:
> > @@ -306,6 +308,13 @@ bool trace_init_backends(void)
> >      openlog(NULL, LOG_PID, LOG_DAEMON);
> >  #endif
> >  
> > +    trace_init_file(getenv("QEMU_TRACE_LOGFILE"));
> > +    trace_init_events(getenv("QEMU_TRACE_EVENTFILE"));
> > +    trace_env = getenv("QEMU_TRACE_EVENTS");
> > +    if (trace_env) {
> > +        trace_enable_events(trace_env);
> > +    }
> > +
> 
> I don't think it is a nice idea to add this via environment variables
> to QEMU itself. Why not modify libqtest qtest_init_without_qmp_handshake
> to read the env vars and then pass a suitable -trace arg when spawning
> QEMU ?

What is the concern about adding these environment variables to QEMU?

It is convenient to be able to use tracing even if QEMU is invoked by
something you cannot modify/control.

The main issues I see with environment variables are:

1. Security.  Is there a scenario where an attacker can use environment
   variables to influence the behavior of a QEMU process running at a
   different trust level?

2. Name collision.  What is the chance that existing users already
   define environment variables with these names and that unexpected
   behavior could result?

Stefan

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