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Re: GNU Coding Standards, automake, and the recent xz-utils backdoor
From: |
Sam James |
Subject: |
Re: GNU Coding Standards, automake, and the recent xz-utils backdoor |
Date: |
Fri, 05 Apr 2024 16:37:02 +0100 |
User-agent: |
mu4e 1.12.2; emacs 30.0.50 |
Bruno Haible <bruno@clisp.org> writes:
> Richard Stallman commented on Jacob Bachmeyer's idea:
>> > > Another related check that /would/ have caught this attempt would be
>> > > comparing the aclocal m4 files in a release against their
>> (meta)upstream
>> > > sources before building a package. This is something distribution
>> > > maintainers could do without cooperation from upstream. If
>> > > m4/build-to-host.m4 had been recognized as coming from gnulib and
>> > > compared to the copy in gnulib, the nonempty diff would have been
>> > > suspicious.
>>
>> I have a hunch that some effort is needed to do that comparison, but
>> that it is feasible to write a script to do it could make it easy.
>> Is that so?
>
> Yes, the technical side of such a comparison is relatively easy to
> implement:
> - There are less than about 2000 or 5000 *.m4 files that are shared
> between projects. Downloading and storing all historical versions
> of these files will take ca. 0.1 to 1 GB.
> - They would be stored in a content-based index, i.e. indexed by
> sha256 hash code.
> - A distribution could then quickly test whether a *.m4 file found
> in a distrib tarball is "known".
>
> The recurrently time-consuming part is, whenever an "unknown" *.m4 file
> appears, to
> - manually review it,
> - update the list of upstream git repositories (e.g. when a project
> has been forked) or the list of releases to consider (e.g. snapshots
> of GNU Autoconf or GNU libtool, or distribution-specific modifications).
>
> I agree with Jacob that a distro can put this in place, without needing
> to bother upstream developers.
I'm currently looking at adding support for this to
https://github.com/hlein/distro-backdoor-scanner. It was brought up at
https://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/04/02/5.
>
> Bruno
best,
sam
- Re: GNU Coding Standards, automake, and the recent xz-utils backdoor, (continued)
- Re: GNU Coding Standards, automake, and the recent xz-utils backdoor, Bruno Haible, 2024/04/01
- Re: GNU Coding Standards, automake, and the recent xz-utils backdoor, Jacob Bachmeyer, 2024/04/02
- Re: GNU Coding Standards, automake, and the recent xz-utils backdoor, Jacob Bachmeyer, 2024/04/02
- Re: GNU Coding Standards, automake, and the recent xz-utils backdoor, Russ Allbery, 2024/04/02
- Re: GNU Coding Standards, automake, and the recent xz-utils backdoor, Eric Gallager, 2024/04/02
- Re: GNU Coding Standards, automake, and the recent xz-utils backdoor, Jacob Bachmeyer, 2024/04/02
- Re: GNU Coding Standards, automake, and the recent xz-utils backdoor, Bruno Haible, 2024/04/02
- Re: checking aclocal m4 files (was: GNU Coding Standards, automake, and the recent xz-utils backdoor), Jacob Bachmeyer, 2024/04/02
- Re: GNU Coding Standards, automake, and the recent xz-utils backdoor, Richard Stallman, 2024/04/04
- Re: GNU Coding Standards, automake, and the recent xz-utils backdoor, Bruno Haible, 2024/04/04
- Re: GNU Coding Standards, automake, and the recent xz-utils backdoor,
Sam James <=
- Re: GNU Coding Standards, automake, and the recent xz-utils backdoor, Richard Stallman, 2024/04/08
- Re: detecting modified m4 files (was: GNU Coding Standards, automake, and the recent xz-utils backdoor), Jacob Bachmeyer, 2024/04/07
- Re: GNU Coding Standards, automake, and the recent xz-utils backdoor, Richard Stallman, 2024/04/04
Re: GNU Coding Standards, automake, and the recent xz-utils backdoor, Jacob Bachmeyer, 2024/04/02
Re: GNU Coding Standards, automake, and the recent xz-utils backdoor, Richard Stallman, 2024/04/01
- Re: GNU Coding Standards, automake, and the recent xz-utils backdoor, Jacob Bachmeyer, 2024/04/02
- Re: GNU Coding Standards, automake, and the recent xz-utils backdoor, Richard Stallman, 2024/04/04
- Re: GCC reporting piped input as a security feature (was: GNU Coding Standards, automake, and the recent xz-utils backdoor), Jacob Bachmeyer, 2024/04/06
- Re: GCC reporting piped input as a security feature (was: GNU Coding Standards, automake, and the recent xz-utils backdoor), Richard Stallman, 2024/04/08
- Re: GCC reporting piped input as a security feature, Jacob Bachmeyer, 2024/04/08