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From: | Jacob Bachmeyer |
Subject: | Re: GNU Coding Standards, automake, and the recent xz-utils backdoor |
Date: | Mon, 01 Apr 2024 23:04:17 -0500 |
User-agent: | Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux x86_64; en-US; rv:1.8.1.22) Gecko/20090807 MultiZilla/1.8.3.4e SeaMonkey/1.1.17 Mnenhy/0.7.6.0 |
Russ Allbery wrote:
[...] There is extensive ongoing discussion of this on debian-devel. There's no real consensus in that discussion, but I think one useful principle that's emerged that doesn't disrupt the world *too* much is that the release tarball should differ from the Git tag only in the form of added files.
From what I understand, the xz backdoor would have passed this check. The backdoor dropper was hidden in test data files that /were/ in the repository, and required code in the modified build-to-host.m4 to activate it. The m4 files were not checked into the repository, instead being added (presumably by running autogen.sh with a rigged local m4 file collection) while preparing the release.
Someone with a copy of a crocked release tarball should check if configure even had the backdoor "as released" or if the attacker was /depending/ on distributions to regenerate configure before packaging xz.
-- Jacob
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