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Re: [Sks-devel] 0xd5920e937cc1e39b shows signatures with 0xca57ad7c cont


From: Yaron Minsky
Subject: Re: [Sks-devel] 0xd5920e937cc1e39b shows signatures with 0xca57ad7c continuing?
Date: Wed, 30 May 2012 19:55:24 -0400

Here's my quick sense of what the reasonable solutions are:
The second one seems more likely to work as a social matter, since building an agreed, trusted authority is tricky.

(To say the obvious, I don't have the time to work on implementing either approach.  But I'm happy to have others do so.  Something like this was part of my original plans for SKS, but it never got done.)

y

On Sun, May 27, 2012 at 6:15 AM, Robert J. Hansen <address@hidden> wrote:
On 5/27/12 5:50 AM, Giovanni Mascellani wrote:
> I'm just a newbie here, but actually I'd like to see the same concept
> applied in a more general way: I think there is much garbage in the
> keyservers, even behind the PGP robo-signer.

The problem here is this violates one of the principle design features
of the keyserver network:

       "We never, never, never lose certificates."

It is preferable for a keyserver to outright go down than it is for even
one certificate to be lost.  If a certificate is lost then a malicious
actor could re-upload another key with the same short ID (a very easy
thing to do), and that could facilitate all different kinds of attacks
on people who don't properly validity-check certificates before using them.

If the keyserver goes down then everyone knows in short order there's a
problem.  If a certificate is lost and silently replaced it might be a
long time before being discovered.  (Discovery is more likely if the
keyserver is synchronizing with others, but there are a lot of
standalone servers.)

Further, expired certificates are still useful.  I have some emails more
than five years old that are still relevant and useful.  If a
certificate gets removed just because it expires, how am I to check the
signature on those messages in order to ensure they haven't been
tampered with?  If the expired certificate remains on the servers,
though, I can download it, validity-check it, and be confident in the
integrity of my message.

The same logic applies to revoked certificates: they're still useful for
the same reasons.

The keyservers never, never, never lose certificates.  That's a design
goal and one that the SKS maintainers believe is a good one.  I agree
with them, and want to see this design goal maintained in all future
development.

That said, welcome to the community, and please understand that although
I think your idea is awful I'm honestly happy to see you here.  :)  The
mailing list is a place where ideas come into violent collision, but we
try to be reasonable human beings to each other.  Welcome!

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